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Late last year, when it was time for me to decide on a topic for my Master’s
thesis, I sat down at my usual seat in the university study hall and began pon-
dering. I pondered on for quite a few weeks as I didn’t feel obligated to go
in any particular direction: I could pretty much write about anything. Soon
enough though, I had filled a small notebook with dozens of ideas and possi-
ble project descriptions. Among the topics were motivational programmes, the
economics of high-speed trains, a single world currency, the Oslo market for
oﬃce space, European pension challenges, the possibility of perpetual economic
growth, public management reform, the link between student eﬀort and labour
market performance, the value of a good reputation, and the economics of hu-
mane farming. I had certainly collected a “well-diversified” bundle of thoughts,
but I wasn’t too ready to write about any of them.
However, as I incessantly came up with new questions and ideas, I kept going
back to the very first thought I wrote down, “the optimal timing of housing
market entrance,” which essentially formed the basis for this thesis. True, the
final topic is the product of numerous alterations of the original idea, but the
core question remains: how can I increase my lifetime wealth and utility by
navigating optimally in the housing market?
Most of this paper is written at my desk in the research assistants’ oﬃce at
the Department of Economics, which I have been fortunate to have at my full
disposal while working on my thesis. For this, and for being a great employer
to a part-time working student, I am truly thankful to the department. I also
thank ESOP — Centre for Equality, Social Organization, and Performance — for
granting me a generous student stipend based on my original thesis proposal.
Unforeseen, time-consuming technical challenges have unfortunately prevented
me from writing as much about social inequality as I had intended, but the
grant has nevertheless been a humbling and inspirational reminder throughout
the process.
Although their web services otherwise are excellent, it wasn’t always easy
to find all the data I needed from Statistics Norway and from the Oslo Stock
Exchange on my own. I therefore thank the good, helpful people at both insti-
tutions for providing me with useful time series and tables.
v
vi PREFACE
Lastly, the contributions of my supervisor, Øystein Børsum, have truly been
indispensable and I am thankful for the helpful comments, the good advice,
and the enthusiasm he has oﬀered from beginning to end. I would also like to
express my gratitude to Espen Henriksen for his invaluable help and support
as I implemented my dynamic model, and to Diderik Lund for patiently taking
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Introduction
Buying a home and entering the housing market is typically the greatest in-
vestment a household will ever make. For most owners, the value of the home
is many times that of all other asset holdings combined and therefore crucial
in the household’s accumulation of wealth over time. Since housing assets can
serve as collateral, people are granted large mortgages, and thus even modest
returns can yield great wealth boosts due to the sheer magnitudes of the invest-
ments. As such, no other form of investment can “pull people up” financially
like housing can.
For example, 350 000 kroner invested in 1966 would on average had grown
to more than 2.5 million 25 years later, in 1991. In real terms this amounts to
a 49 % return on the housing investment. Further, by staying in the housing
market, the 2.5 million 1991 dwelling would on average had increased in value
to over 8.7 million in 2006.1 The latter period was thus even more impressive
return-wise than the former, producing an annual, real price growth rate of over
7%.
Of course, owning a home also produces housing benefits of great value to
the owner-occupier. Everyone needs a place to live and owning a home secures
a steady flow of dwelling services that would otherwise have had to be bought
in the rental market. Housing is therefore often called a dual asset since its
demand is driven both by the consumption- and the investment properties that
come with it. As decisions regarding the housing asset profoundly influence the
lifetime wealth and general utility of the individual household, a formal study of
this topic should be most warranted. Drawing inspiration from the literature,
the modest ambition of this thesis is therefore to probe into some aspects of
households’ resource allocation.
The presence of a rental market allows the divorce of housing consumption
and housing investment. In theory we could have a household renting its de-
sired quantity of dwelling services in the rental market and investing optimally
in housing assets and other assets elsewhere. One could for example imagine
“splitting” housing units into smaller pieces and trade these almost like stocks:
rent would then yield dividend to the owners while the house price appreciation
would stand for the capital gains (Caplin et al., 1994). With such a market in
place the household could fully separate consumption and investment with the
1These historical returns are discussed in Chapters 2 and 1 respectively.
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added benefit of diversification of the housing portfolio.2 In practice however,
this is diﬃcult since such a market for “pieces of houses” does not exist. Neither
does a real estate futures market (as proposed by Case et al. (1993)) nor more
general housing price index funds. In light of this, it would be quite a coinci-
dence if households’ holdings of housing are optimal from an investor point of
view. In fact, Brueckner’s (1997) theoretical treatment shows that household
portfolios, in which the amounts of housing are determined by consumption de-
mand, are ineﬃcient relative to those where investment and consumption are
fully separated.
However, households seem to prefer owning to renting regardless of any pos-
sible discrepancy between consumption demand and investment demand. When
asked in 1997, 95% of Norwegian households said they preferred owning to rent-
ing (Løwe, 2002a). Only after age 70 did this figure drop below 90% when 14%
said they preferred some kind of renting arrangement. All other age groups
went overwhelmingly for owning. Why this taste for homeownership? Said sur-
vey did not ask its respondents, but easy arguments might be the unwillingness
to “throw money out the window” by being a renter, the desire to control the
appearance and the fixtures of the dwelling, and perhaps a wish for the absence
of a disagreeable landlord.
So what about actual behaviour? In Norway, around 50% of households
owned the dwelling they lived in right after the First World War. The per-
centage increased steadily through the 20th century until stabilising just above
80% in the late 1990s, then a share among the highest in the world. Gulbrand-
sen (2004) comments that this widespread ownership is largely owed to active
government policies and subsidies to self-owned units. Low-interest state mort-
gages were given to construction of new dwellings as long as they did not exceed
certain limitations on size and building cost, and housing cooperatives were set
up to provide members with cheap but high quality central dwellings. Further,
the governments of the 1950s and 1960s emphasised low-cost self-owned hous-
ing for low-income earners rather than providing publicly owned rental units.
This policy stood in sharp contrast to those of many European countries (Kurz
and Blossfeld, 2004), and may have contributed substantially to the evident
Norwegian taste for owner-occupancy.
The overall homeownership rate in Norway has been stably high for a while,
but what if we consider this in relation to household characteristics? Not sur-
prisingly, young households are less likely to be owners than older households,
but even for the 25-29 cohort the ownership rate was 62% in 1997 (Gulbrandsen,
2004). In fact, roughly 70% of households are established as owner-occupiers
before the age of 30 (Andersen, 2002). Further, wealthier households own con-
siderably more housing than those of fewer means, and homeownership as such
appears to be closely correlated with household income: in the bottom income
quintile the homeownership rate is only 61% while it is 95% for the top quintile.
In between, the rate rises consistently with income. Among older cohorts the
2Say you reside in a dwelling you own a certain share of and, at the same time, own smaller
pieces of other dwellings elsewhere.
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ownership rate quickly reaches 90% before dropping slightly for the oldest.
It thus seem like a priority for people to get into the housing market as early
as possible, which is an especially good idea if one believes real house prices are
steadily increasing over time. We will note in the first chapter however, that this
is definitely not always the case: true, real housing price has shown an upward
trend in both the short- and the long-run, but there have been several periods
of time where prices have fallen too over the years.
Moreover, the owning preference is rationalised financially as well: one unit
of rental housing is more expensive than an equivalent unit of self-owned hous-
ing (Brueckner, 1997). That is, in principle, a dwelling’s monthly market rent
is higher than the same dwelling’s monthly cost (mortgage interest payments,
maintenance, etc.) had it instead been an owner-occupier residence. Why?
Firstly, a landlord’s rental income is taxed just as any other income, while the
housing services produced by a self-owned dwelling are not taxed at all. Nat-
urally, the landlord will roll these taxes over on the tenant’s rent. Secondly,
assuming renters will be less careful and vigilant about the dwelling’s condition
than homeowners, rental units will depreciate faster and require more mainte-
nance, thus forcing landlords to add a premium to rents.
From any household’s point of view, consumption and investment in the
housing market is somewhat risky. While the renter faces the risk of increased
rents, the owner is exposed to interest rate risk. If the home purchase is fi-
nanced by a floating rate mortgage (which the vast majority of Norwegian pur-
chases are), the monthly payments will depend to a considerable extent on fairly
volatile interest rates. The latter eﬀect has of course been especially visible in
recent months when many low-income owners have had trouble keeping up with
mortgage payments.
The general uncertainty of housing prices and the possibility of large fluctu-
ations present two opposing “risks” for the renter and the owner. Whether the
renter plans to become an owner in the future or not, a relative price increase
on housing today means immediate redistribution of wealth from non-owners to
owners. The renter thus becomes relatively poorer and it will be more diﬃcult
to enter the housing market later. If, on the other hand, there is a drop in real
prices, the owner is worse oﬀ while the renter may enter the housing market
at a relatively lower cost than those who entered earlier. The fact that hous-
ing investment usually entails purchasing a single, immobile unit amplifies the
risk to the homeowner considerably. Even if the overall market is performing
well, individual properties may very well suﬀer negative idiosyncratic shocks to
their value. Further, a crucial characteristic of a housing investment is that it is
illiquid, meaning that buying and selling is costly in terms of time and money.
With respect to the latter and to the size of unit investments, equity diﬀers
greatly from the housing asset. It is also what perhaps comes first to mind when
we talk about “investment” as such. Although investments in the stock market
are risky (potentially a lot riskier than in the housing market), the nature of
this market allows the spreading of one’s total investment over many sectors
and companies so that the overall risk may be lowered substantially. Such
diversification is impossible in the housing market with just one asset unit, thus
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the inclusion of stocks in the household portfolio might mitigate one’s exposure
to risk. Further, with reference to the example above, stock market returns
are usually no short of those in the housing market. For instance, say 100 000
kroner were invested in equity in 1966. By 1991 this would have amounted to,
on average, a whopping 1.9 million. In real terms the 25-year return was nearly
430%. Almost shockingly, this pales in comparison to the nominal value in 2006
had the investment remained in the market: 24.4 million kroner. Clearly, equity
holdings are something any optimising household should seriously consider.
In the following we will consider the household both as an investor and as a
consumer, but abstract from the rent-own decision for simplicity. In Chapter 1
the Norwegian household portfolio will be put under scrutiny together with the
performance of corresponding assets. Properties of housing and stocks as assets
will be discussed, naturally with weight on the former. The key question that
emerges is that of how to optimally allocate one’s resources and how to best
compose a portfolio of assets when housing is explicitly included on the list of
available investments (as opposed to taking the housing holdings as exogenously
given). Given the history of actual asset returns in Norway, are the households’
actual portfolio compositions close to being “optimal?” Are we perhaps able to
explain the observed behaviour by a couple of simple models? How do optimal
allocations evolve and change over time and over the households’ age?
We will try to answer these questions in Chapters 2 and 3 where we employ
a static model and a dynamic model respectively. The prescriptions of these will
presumably contrast quite notably since their stylisations of the world diﬀer in
key areas. It will hopefully be an interesting exercise to investigate which one
comes closest to our observations and how they each rationalise their advice on
optimal allocations.
Chapter 4 briefly summarises the findings and approaches.
Chapter 1
Asset returns and portfolio
observations
If our goal is to talk about how households should behave when faced with
diﬀerent financial- and real investment opportunities, we must first sort out the
properties of these alternatives. A natural strategy will then be to look at how
the various assets have performed in the past.
Further, advices on how people should behave are of little interest if we
cannot relate these prescriptions to how people actually allocate their resources.
This chapter seeks to address both these topics, starting with the latter.
1.1 Observed portfolios
To get an idea of households’ actual portfolios we will follow Harding et al.
(2004) and employ data from the Income Distribution Survey 2002 from Sta-
tistics Norway.1 This is the most recent survey of its kind and it is based on
interviews with, and tax returns of, over 22 000 households in Norway. Table
1.1 reproduces the survey’s findings of the average household property account.2
In the the models of the next chapters we will assume that the household
may hold the following assets; housing, stocks, and positive or negative amounts
of an interest-yielding risk-free asset. The data from Table 1.1 must therefore
be rearranged into these categories for comparison.
Total real capital is in the table composed of real properties and other types
of capital owned by the household. The latter is mostly cars, boats, machines,
furniture, farm animals etc., and will be ignored as the observed portfolio is
established. Real properties are primary dwellings, holiday cabins, farm houses,
business properties etc., and will hereafter be labelled “housing.”
1Available online: http://www.ssb.no/emner/05/01//nos_inntektformue/
2The components of gross financial capital are found in Statistics Norway’s Statistical
yearbook 2004 (Table 215) as the survey report does not include these details.
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NOK
1. Total real capital 302 000
of which:
1.1 Real properties 236 400
1.2 Other capital 65 600
2. Gross financial capital 363 700
of which:
2.1 Bank deposits 205 800
2.2 Unit trust fund (stocks) 13 400
2.3 Bond and money market funds 9 100
2.4 Foreign bank deposits, bonds, stocks 4 300
2.5 Registered securities 21 600
2.6 Unregistered securities 65 500
2.7 Other claims 44 100
3. Debt 495 500
Net wealth 170 200
Table 1.1: Avereage household property account in Norway 2002. Source: Sta-
tistics Norway’s Income Distribution Survey 2002.
Unfortunately, the figure reported in Table 1.1 is the taxable value of the
housing asset, not the actual market value. Taxable values tend to be much
lower than the market values since they are usually based on appraisals or on
property owners’ own assessments. Statistics Norway has estimated the ratio
of taxable value to market value by comparing the sales price and the pre-sale
taxable value of individual dwellings. The result was, in both the 1999 and 2005
study, a ratio of 0.2.3
Rather than assuming that this ratio also holds for 2002, we will go back
to the Income Distribution Survey and collect the taxable value of housing in
1999. This value, 190 000, is divided on the relevant ratio and multiplied with
the housing price index. The latter amounts to 1.27 from 1999 to 2002 so that4
Market value (2002) =
190 000 · 1.27
0.2
= 1 207 135. (1.1)
Next, gross financial capital can be decomposed as stocks, bonds and bank
deposits. We will merge the latter two into a “risk-free” asset. Bank deposits
and bond and money market funds (2.1 and 2.3) belong here. Unit trust fund
holdings (2.2) are assumed to be stocks although these funds often include sig-
nificant holdings of bonds as well. Registered securities (2.5) are those securities
registered with the Norwegian Central Securities Depository in 2002. According
3http://www.ssb.no/emner/05/03/sbolig/
4With (year) 2000 = 100, Statistics Norway reports the 1999 to 2002 price level ratio to
be 111.4/87.7 = 1.27.
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NOK Share
Housing 1 207 135 1.175
Stocks 91 790 0.089
Risk-free -271 890 -0.264
Net wealth 1 027 035 1.000
Table 1.2: Average household portfolio in Norway 2002. Source: Statistics
Norway and own calculations.
to the depository’s own statistics, stocks make up 90% of households’ registered
securities while 10% are bonds.5 Assuming that this division also holds for un-
registered securities (2.6), holdings of bonds and stocks can be identified as 8
710 and 78 390 respectively in posts 2.5 and 2.6 combined.
Foreign bank deposits, bearer bonds and stocks (2.4) and other claims (2.7)
will be ignored in the following due to their somewhat “foggy” definitions.
1.1.1 An undiversified portfolio
Table 1.2 presents the actual mean household portfolio in both kroner and as
shares of household net wealth. It is now clear that the average household
has a highly undiversified portfolio; the housing asset holdings are nearly four
times greater than the holdings of the other two assets combined. I addition,
the housing holdings are typically in one or two individual properties, not in,
say, housing market funds. As we will discuss below, the idiosyncratic risks
of homeownership should be quite substantial so that a portfolio like that in
Table 1.2 is very risky for the household. Further we see that the stock market
participation is generally very low with a stocks-to-housing ratio of just 0.076.
This is known as the portfolio choice puzzle in the literature (Hu, 2005). Cocco
(2004) explains this by pointing to the housing risk: since the market- and
idiosyncratic risks of housing are so high, households compensate by holding
risk-free assets, i.e., reducing the mortgage rather than investing in the equity
market. Stocks are thus crowded out by housing holdings due to households’
aversion to risk. This argument also explains why the average debt is so low.
Harding et al. (2004) equivalently calculate the average portfolios for five
consecutive years, 1998-2002. The holding shares seem fairly constant over this
period except for that of stocks. The holdings of stocks were almost twice as high
in the late 1990s as in the early 2000s (relative to average net wealth). This
can perhaps be owed to the post-11 September 2001 downturn in the global
stock markets: intuitively, poorer equity returns should have caused people to
substitute away from stocks, at least temporarily. It may be a good idea to
keep this in the back of our heads in the following: the share of stocks may be
artificially low in the 2002 survey data.
5Statistics available on the depository’s website: http://www.vps.no/.
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-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-66 67-79 80-
Housing 2.848 2.607 1.492 1.132 0.959 0.801 0.736
Stocks 0.121 0.117 0.077 0.064 0.064 0.037 0.022
Risk-free -1.969 -1.724 -0.568 -0.229 -0.023 0.162 0.243
Relative wealth 0.074 0.340 1.054 1.843 2.233 1.846 1.177
Table 1.3: Portfolio shares of age cohorts in Norway 2002. Source: Statistics
Norway and own calculations.
1.1.2 Portfolios by age and wealth
The same procedure that led to Table 1.2 produces Table 1.3 when we consider
property accounts by age cohorts.6 The fourth row reports the ratio of cohort
net wealth to population average net wealth. Unsurprisingly, young households
start out with very little wealth, accumulate assets rapidly, and peak right before
retirement. At all stages of life, housing accounts for a very large share of the
average household’s portfolio: from nearly three times net worth early in life to
just under three quarters at the end. The average portfolio of Table 1.2 now
looks almost cautious in comparison to the situation of the young households.
This mirrors the holdings by age in Sweden in 1989 almost perfectly (Englund
et al., 2000), while American households exhibit even more extreme diﬀerences
across cohorts; from a housing share of 3.5 times net wealth for the youngest,
to just 0.65 for the oldest (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002).
Assuming most of the debt to be mortgage, the housing holdings are also
heavily leveraged7 early on at around 70% and 66% for the first and second
cohorts.
The share of risky stock holdings is highest for the youngest group and
declines consistently with age, in itself an indication of (relative) risk aversion
increasing with age. On the other hand, one could perhaps make the argu-
ment that there has been increasing awareness, and marketing, of stock market
investments over the years, making equity a more dominant asset in younger
portfolios.
Table 1.4 reports portfolio shares by wealth quartile.8 What is most striking
6The Income Distribution Survey 2002 asked the respondent of the age of the “head” of
the household (presumably this is the oldest member).
7By “leverage” we here refer to the magnitude of debt relative to housing holdings.
8Obtaining these portfolio shares was a bit more cumbersome than those in the other ta-
bles since Statistics Norway does not report full balance sheet details for the gross financial
capital for wealth quartiles. Instead, everything but bank deposits is bagged in “other claims.”
Fortunately, financial capital details are available in a table reporting average balance sheets
for persons (not households) by quartiles (the Income Distribution Survey 2002 again). From
these numbers we calculate the stocks-to-other claims ratio and bonds-to-other claims ratio
for each quartile and assume that the per person data is representative enough for house-
holds. Multiplying the households’ financial “other claims” with the relevant ratios yields the
portfolio shares of Table 4.
Further, we assumed above (in the discussion of posts 2.5 and 2.6 in Table 1) that “securi-
ties” was 90% stocks and 10% bonds. This is true for the average investor, but probably not
for, say, the average first or fourth quartile household. We will however let this inaccuracy
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Housing -0.462 1.862 1.297 0.919
Stocks -0.014 0.018 0.017 0.103
Risk-free 1.969 -1.477 -0.880 -0.022
Relative wealth -0.119 0.484 1.340 3.431
Table 1.4: Portfolio shares by wealth quartiles in Norway 2002. Source: Statis-
tics Norway and own calculations.
with this panel is that the poorest households have negative net wealth and
a whopping 310% leverage of total assets. Much of this is presumably due
to low-income students with few real or financial assets but relatively large
loans (which, fortunately, do not require collateral). The background numbers
however, reveal that only about 23% of the first quartile’s debt are student
loans, implying 65% of total debt being unsecured. Although the numbers in
the first column of Table 1.4 are negative for housing and stocks, it is not the case
that the poorest households hold negative amounts of these assets (or positive
amounts of the risk-free asset for that matter): since debt overall outweighs all
other holdings, net wealth is negative and thus positive holdings appear with
minus signs in the tabulation.
Further, it is clear that the portfolio compositions evolve much in the same
manner as when we considered age groups: wealthier households hold less of
their net wealth in housing and are less indebted. But, while older households
generally hold a smaller share of stocks in their portfolio, wealthier households
hold larger equity shares than poorer households.
Curiously, the fourth quartile’s portfolio seems to match the portfolio of the
55-66 cohort almost perfectly. Both hold about 90% of their wealth in housing,
owe roughly 2.3% of net worth, and own quite a lot of stocks. Moreover, the
average fourth quartile household is relatively richer and has placed over 10% of
its worth in risky assets, while the 55-66 cohort has settled on 6.4%. Of course,
learning that people in their 50s and early 60s share behavioural traits with
with those in the richest quartile of the population is hardly surprising (as we
would expect these groups to overlap considerably).
1.1.3 Homeownership rates
The portfolio tables reported average holdings of “housing,” but did not say
anything about how many households were actually homeowners. Table 1.5
however, shows that the Norwegian homeownership rate is generally high and
that owner-occupier status tends to follow income and age (where again the
former closely follow the latter in the aggregate). The first row tells us that most
people enter the housing market early and remain owners throughout their lives.
The decline in the ownership rate after age 80 is not surprising as many then
(together with oh, so many others) slip through.
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Cohort 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-66 67-79 80-
Owner-occupiers 0.69 0.78 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.72
Income quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Owner-occupiers 0.61 0.75 0.84 0.91 0.95
Table 1.5: Homeownership rates by age and income. Norway 2001 and 1997.
Note: Rates by age are from the Population and housing census 2001 (Statistics
Norway) while rates by income are from Gulbrandsen (2004) and refers to a
1997 survey. These two measures are not directly comparable since the former
asked how many who lived in an owner-occupied dwelling while the latter asked
how many households owned their dwelling.
move into nursing homes, “retirement communities” (and, in principle, become
renters), or perhaps low-maintenance rental units.
The second row confirms a growing suspicion: as people become wealthier
and can aﬀord a housing purchase, they prefer homeownership to renting. Al-
most all high-income households own their dwelling, while nearly 40% of the
first quintile households do not. A relative increase in housing prices will thus
result in an exacerbation of social inequality by redistributing wealth towards
those who already are high-income earners and homeowners. Overall, the total
homeownership rate in Norway is roughly 0.8, which is very high internation-
ally (Gulbrandsen, 2004). The rate has been stable and high the last couple of
decades.
1.2 Asset returns
In the next chapters we will try to calculate the optimal household portfolios by
employing a static model and a dynamic model. The models will be formulated
so that only three assets are available to the investor: housing, stocks, and a
risk-free asset. We will therefore be needing some estimates of expected returns,
variances, and covariances. Norwegian data from the period 1992-2006 will be
used due to the availability of the house price index and because we want to be
able to compare our results to the observed 2002 portfolios.9 As the whole topic
of accurate asset returns is really not the main focus of our discussion, we will
allow ourselves to take a not-so thorough approach below. Rather than setting
heaven and earth in motion searching for the best possible estimates, we will
settle for what seems ”reasonable.”
9The reason for starting in 1992 is that Statistics Norway did not report housing price
changes until the launch of the house price index (HPI) in 1991. Indices have later been
constructed going all the way back to the 1800s, but the HPI itself is quite new. We will
discuss longer perspectives below, but for the main analysis we will stick to our 14 year
horizon for which we have reliable and easily available data.
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1.2.1 Risk-free return
Since we will assume that a single risk-free asset can be held in both positive
(bank deposits or bonds) and negative (debt/mortgage) amounts it seems now
reasonable to determine the rate of return, rf , somewhere between the actual
deposit- and mortgage rates. We will therefore use the average real bond rate
as reported by Statistics Norway for this purpose.10
The assumption may be justified as follows: Households with significant
holdings of the risk-free asset are expected to seek the best possible interest on
their “investment” given that there is no risk involved. Would they not place
at least some of their money in long-term bonds, ”safe” market funds, and
in dedicated high-interest accounts? That is, assuming that households with
positive net holdings of the risk-free asset only receive the regular bank deposit
rate does not sound intuitively right; they should be able to do better.
Borrowing households obviously can not do much better than the bank’s
regular mortgage rate, which lies fairly close to the bond rate for the period
under discussion. When people decide to take up a mortgage they may elect to
keep the rate fixed for some years (perhaps even for the full mortgage term), but
we will abstract from such a complication here. Looking at Figure 1.1 however,
we notice that the bond rate is more stable than the bank rates, so again,
the bond rate seems like a decent compromise when we know that borrowing
households do have a choice between fixed and floating mortgage rates. It might
however be worth mentioning that Norwegian borrowers almost always go for
the floating rate while fixed rate mortgages are much more popular in the U.S.
and in many other countries (van Hemert, 2006).
For our period, 1992-2006, we have used quarterly data and found that the
annual mean real bond rate was 0.0413 with a standard deviation of 0.0145. This
is as good as risk-free when we remember that a standard deviation of 0.0145
means that over two-thirds of the observations lie in the interval [0.027, 0.056]
when the asset return is assumed to be normally distributed (a cornerstone
of the next chapter’s basic portfolio model). None of the observations were
negative. Figure 1.1 shows that there has been a clear decline in the rate since
the early 1990’s, which was a period of financial distress in Norway and in many
other countries.
To keep things simple, we will adjust our estimate of the rate of return
for 28% taxation on capital gains and interest (Sørensen, 2005). This of course
lowers the implied mortgage rate as well, which makes good sense since mortgage
interest payments are tax deductable. The real, after-tax, risk-free return is thus
approximated at 0.0413 · (1− 0.28) ≈ 0.03.
10Mortgage-, deposit-, bond- and inflation rates are from Statistics Norway’s Statistical
yearbook 2007.
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Figure 1.1: Real mortgage-, deposit- and bond rates. Smoothed annual obser-
vations. Source: Statistical yearbook 2007, Statistics Norway.
1.2.2 Stock market return
Holding stocks, or equity rather, yield two streams of return; capital gains11
and dividends. These streams are taxed diﬀerently in diﬀerent tax regimes, but
usually at the same rate. We will use the development on the Oslo Stock Ex-
change over the 1992-2006 period to find numbers on the risk and return from
what we will generically call “stocks.” We will hereafter assume that these are
units/shares of well-diversified stock market portfolios. In Norway, the statua-
tory tax rate on the capital gain component has been (and still is) 28% since
1992, while dividends was not taxed at all until 2005.12 In order to calculate
the true after-tax return on stocks we thus need separate time series of prices
and dividends. For the former we will use the OSEBXPR index which reports
the evolution of stock prices at the Oslo Stock Exchange.13 Since this index
was not initiated until 1995 we use data from a historical price index14 for the
years 1992-1994. Statistics Norway’s macro model of the Norwegian economy,
MODAG, includes a variable called RENAMF300,15 reporting the dividend rate
of return of Norwegian stocks, which we will use to find the total stock market
11 If we’re lucky that is, capital loss might just as well be the case.
12The actual tax rate on capital gains is less than 28% due to significant allowances for
retained profits, but we will abstract from this complication here (Sørensen, 2005).
13Time series provided by Oslo Børs Informasjon AS.
14Klovland (2004b), more on this in the next section.
15Thanks to Statistics Norway for providing the time series!
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Figure 1.2: After-tax capital gain rate and dividend rate. Smoothed annual
observations. Source: Oslo Stock Exchange, Norges Bank and Statistics Norway.
return.
Due to availability of data, we use annual series for the expected return and
find that the mean after-tax capital return rate was 0.105 for 1992-2006. The
average (non-taxed) dividend rate was 0.13 in the same period, which sounds
very high. From Figure 1.2 we see a tremendous rise in dividends right before
2005, the year the dividend tax was introduced. Apart from this peak, however,
it is clear that the rate was fairly stable in the 1990s and early 2000s with an
average of 0.104 for 1992-2002. We will therefore use the latter as our estimate of
the dividend rate and consider the observations of 2003-2005 an abnormality.16
Summing the two return components and adjusting for inflation yield an
annual mean real rate of return of 0.188. The volatility of stock market returns
is, for computational convenience, measured by the regular benchmark index17
(since the tax rate is constant) and inflation. Now using quarterly series’, we
find the standard deviation of the 1992-2006 sample to be roughly 0.2.
16Larger than usual dividends were paid out due to the imminent introduction of dividend
taxation.
17OSEBX, available from the Oslo Stock Exchange and from Statistics Norway.
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1.2.3 Housing as an asset and a consumption vehicle
It is far from obvious how to estimate the risk and return of housing, our third
type of asset. Similar to equity, housing yields two streams of return: capital
gain or loss, and the benefit from living in one’s owned dwelling. We will measure
the capital gain component by the house price index (HPI) as it is reported by
Statistics Norway. The monthly 1992-2006 series was first transformed18 into a
quarterly series which was then used to find the quarterly returns of the capital
component. Similarly constructed quarterly inflation rates were used to find the
real return.
Housing dividend
The housing service received from a self-owned dwelling may be called “divi-
dend” but is unlike its equity counterpart in that it is not measured in money,
but rather in units of utility. The latter is naturally not observable and thus our
first challenge is to find some approximating measure so that we may estimate
the true total return from the housing asset.
The rationale for including the dividend is clear: if the household for some
reason could not enjoy the fruits of homeownership (i.e., not been able to live
in one’s dwelling) it would have had to buy housing services somewhere else at
some cost. But, since owner-occupiers do consume (or lease out) the housing
service emitted from their dwelling, they implicitly receive the equivalent of this
cost in what we will call dividend or imputed rent. At first the computation
of this imputed rent may seem straightforward: just use data on actual rents
and adjust for dwelling size. However, there are a number of problems with this
approach.
First, self-owned dwellings and leased dwellings are typically very diﬀerent
qualitatively. Rented units are most often found in urban areas and in apartment
buildings while self-owned units are larger and more often in rural and suburban
areas. In fact, rented dwellings are on average only half the size of self-owned
dwellings.19 Would it then be reasonable to assume that the rent-to-house value
ratio of the former is representative for that of the latter? Not necessarily.
Second, there may be a significant element of moral hazard in the rental
market. It is often assumed that renters have weaker incentives to take suﬃcient
“care” of their dwelling than owners (Brueckner, 1997), so that rents should
be somewhat inflated due to landlords rolling the added depreciation over on
the tenants’ rents. Of course, this element would in principle just add to the
implied dividends as well if the household considers renting and owning perfect
substitutes.
Third, people’s taste for homeownership is not entirely financial as they
might experience substantial additional “utility” from owning rather than rent-
ing even if the dwelling is qualitatively the same. Less restrictions on own
18Three-month average as quarterly observation.
19Rental market survey 2005, Statistics Norway.
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behaviour and dwelling customisation are obvious examples. Such an argument
implies a higher dividend than rent for an identical housing unit.
Fourth, as we discuss briefly below, rents are subject to taxation while hous-
ing dividends are not. That is, renting is less eﬃcient and less attractive for all
parties involved.
Despite all objections, by far the most realistic estimator of housing divi-
dend must be rents of a similar (also geographically) dwelling, although perhaps
adjusted in some fashion. Trouble is, actual rent-to-house value data on owner-
occupier representative dwellings are hard to come by. Ideally, the dividend
should be estimated by a careful study of “owner-like” rental units and their
rent-to-house value ratio. As a potential “second best” solution, we can find
the rent-to-price ratio for the housing market as a whole. By dividing annual
average rent per square metre by average price per square meter, we find an
average ratio of 0.068 over 1992-2006.20 To use this as an estimate of housing
dividend we will, for one thing, have to subtract the depreciation rate, but we
are not quite ready to settle with this. Let us discuss some other strategies first.
Diﬀerent approaches
Himmelberg et al. (2005) employ the user cost approach of Poterba (1984) and
find that the dividend-to-house value ratio should be roughly 0.05 under a set
of reasonable assumptions.21 That is, the annual value of the housing service
received is 5% of the dwelling’s market value, or in other words; a house’s market
value should be around 20 times its annual “rent value.” As Himmelberg et al.
point out however, rents have not kept up with prices since the late 1990s.
Harding et al. (2004) on the other hand, divide the aggregate rents paid
on the total stock of leased units. This produces the desired ratio, but it may
be flawed due to inaccurate tax reporting (as data originate from filed tax re-
ports via the national accounts) and the problem of representativeness discussed
above. That said, it does sound like a fair estimate of housing dividend from
the population of rental units at least, and it may perhaps be the closest we get
without submerging ourselves in a detailed analysis of said topic. For 1992-2002
they settle on an estimate of 0.04 of the housing dividend.
Røed Larsen and Weum (2007) follow Case and Shiller (1989) in assuming
that the average dividend-to-house value ratio is 0.05.22 They further use repeat
sales data from OBOS, a housing co-op in Oslo, and a rental index to compute
20Average annual rents per square metre was found for 2006 from the Rental Market Survey
2007 and calculated backwards using the rent component of the consumer price index. Online:
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/08/02/30/lmu_en/
21Sadly, with our data on house price appreciation, the user cost measure is not at all to
our liking...
22The 0.05 ratio assumption is very common in the literature: it may seem as if this should
be true in a well-adjusted market with no price bubbles or any other imbalances. Aaron (1970)
test 0.04 and 0.06 and finds the former most appropriate for his dataset. Jud and Winkler
(2005) report the average imputed rent (1978-2001) in the U.S. market to be around 0.058
and fairly stable over time (Bureau of Economic Analysis).
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the return from housing. Since OBOS units are very similar to rental units
(smaller, urban apartments), many of the before mentioned diﬃculties with
using rental data to find imputed rents of self-owned dwellings are avoided, but
the estimates may still not be representative for the typical self-owned dwelling.
Relying on a rental index, they find that for OBOS units in Oslo, the dividend-
to-house price ratio has gone from approximately 0.09 in 1992 to 0.03 a decade
later. The key here is not necessarily these levels, since the period mean is
essentially a guess, but that there has been a significant decline in the 1990s.
Flavin and Yamashita (2002) do not find their estimates from the rental
market directly. Instead, they use American PSID data23 and assume that the
rental rate of any unit can be modelled as Dt = (rf + δ)Pt−1 + ωt where rf
is the assumed constant real risk-free rate, δ is the depreciation rate, Pt−1 is
house market value, and ω is property tax. That is, if the dwelling was to be
leased out, the owner would require just enough in rent to match the return
otherwise yielded by the risk-free asset. Further, the owner has running costs of
Ct = δPt−1+(1−τ)ωt where τ is the marginal income tax rate (reflecting the tax
deduction from homeownership). The total return is house value appreciation
plus dividend (Dt), less costs of owning (Ct):
rh,t =
Pt − Pt−1 +Dt − Ct
Pt−1
=
Pt + rfPt−1 + τωt − Pt−1
Pt−1
.
For Norwegian conditions, the property tax can for all practical purposes be set





That is, dividend is just the real interest rate. This assumption is similar to that
of van Hemert (2006) who sets the imputed rent equal to the mean real interest
rate in his study of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates. It is tempting to
adopt this approach due to its simplicity and plausability.
Figure 1.3 plots the Norwegian real interest rate together with the rent-to-
price ratio discussed above, both normalised with respect to their period mean.
The connection is clear and it seems very reasonable to use the interest rate as
a dividend estimate. The former was found above to be 0.03 but let us add a
percentage point to reflect the benefits from owning relative to renting, so that
we get a rate of 0.04. This also fits well with the rent-to-price ratio when we
23Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1968-1992. Homeowners were asked how much their
house would sell for “today.”
24 In Norway, the question of whether or not to impose property tax is the prerogative of local
authorities. Although roughly 50% of the population live in municipalities where property
taxes are collected, the tax itself is very modest at a maximum rate of 0.7% of taxable property
value. And, as mentioned earlier, taxable value is found to be roughly 20% of actual market
value, according to Statistics Norway.
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Figure 1.3: Normalised rent-to-price ratio and “risk-free” real interest rate.
Smoothed annual observations. Source: Statistics Norway and own calculations.
subtract a depreciation rate of 0.03.25
Total return to housing
The mean, annual, real housing price index growth rate was 0.071 over 1992-
2006 with a standard deviation of 0.056. With the above assumed dividend rate
of 0.04, this produces a total annual real return of 0.11.
1.2.4 Housing risk
After making the simplifying assumption that dividends are as good as equal
to the real return on bonds, the first bridge on the way to a description of the
housing asset has been crossed. The second bridge crossing, which we will worry
about now, requires decent estimates of the housing asset’s own variance and
the covariances with the other two assets.
What we have basically said so far is that the return from a housing invest-
ment is the sum of the random variable measuring capital gain (HPI growth)
and the constructed dividend rate. While the latter is almost a constant in the
25Statistics Norway reported a depreciation rate of roughly 0.03 for the housing stock in
2004 (see Chapter 3).
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short run and should not be considered a random variable, the former inhabits
significant volatility. Together however, the variance of this return series is way
too low if we want to consider a single housing asset. Much of the risk associ-
ated with a single house is in fact eliminated by the aggregation of sales data
regionally and nationally.
As the typical housing holdings of a household are its primary residence
and maybe a holiday home, it is exposed to significant idiosyncratic risk and
uncertainty. Not only with regards to future price development, but also with
the quality of the stream of housing service. True, people are often insured
against value (and service) decreasing contingencies such as water damage, con-
struction error, fire, termite attack, etc. But what about a noisy new road
practically next door, a new smelly smokestack on a nearby factory, “unfair”
government expropriation, or simply a pair of bad neighbours? One may of
course seek satisfaction by taking legal action against the wrongdoers, but this
may be very costly.
On the other hand, homeowners may enjoy unanticipated excess increases
in value and service as well. Think of a road (a bit away from the property,
mind) greatly reducing the travel time into the city, (unexpected) permission to
cut down trees hindering a great view, abolition of residential obligation,26 or a
general appreciation of one’s neighbourhood relative to other areas.
Case and Shiller (1989) mention that the annual standard deviation of return
from a single house or property should be close to that of individual stock
returns, in their case 0.15. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) use data from individual
homeowner assessments (the PSID survey) and report a standard deviation of
0.14 for the period 1968-1992, while the stock market return standard deviation
was 0.24 for the same sample. Goetzmann (1993) uses the same data as Case
and Shiller and finds that the standard deviation of single house investment
returns lies between 0.095 and 0.127 for four American cities (1971-1985) by
adding a disturbance term to the asset return. Standard deviation of stock
returns was found to be 0.185.
If we look at the ratio of single house standard deviation-to-stock market
standard deviation in the latter two papers, we find this to be 0.58 and 0.6
respectively.27 Englund et al. (2002) use diﬀerent investment horizons, but we
find the ten quarter horizon ratio to be 0.54.
We will assume a 0.6 ratio to be a decent approximation and thus set the
standard deviation of our housing return to 0.12 (since we have found the stock
market standard deviation to be roughly 0.2). van Hemert (2006) took a similar
approach by fixing the housing standard deviation at 0.15 after Case and Shiller.
But, simply scaling the housing return around the its mean accordingly (as in
van Hemert’s paper) will not do in our case as we are also looking for covariances
and correlations with other asset returns. The key property of the idiosyncratic
risk component is of course that it is assumed uncorrelated with everything else.
26Especially relevant for potential holiday properties in attractive areas, e.g. the skerries of
Southern Norway.
27Average standard deviation of the four cities for the Goetzmann paper.
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Housing Stocks Risk-free
Mean 0.110 0.188 0.030








Risk-free -0.027 0.032 1.000
Table 1.6: Asset return estimates based on actual asset returns over 1992-2006.
Source: Statistics Norway, Norges Bank, Oslo Stock Exchange and own calcu-
lations.
We may write the housing return as
rh,t = rHPI,t + rDIV,t + εt
where εt is an independently normally distributed disturbance term with zero
mean and a standard deviation such that the total asset return’s standard devi-
ation goes asymptotically towards 0.12 (annual standard deviation of the capital
gain plus dividend time series was found to be 0.055 meaning that the distur-
bance term must contribute with 0.065). We use the random number generator
with a normal distribution in Microsoft Excel to find the disturbance time series
which we subsequently add to the original housing series. Of course, with only
60 realisations, the new housing series’ standard deviation may not be exactly
0.12, but we pick the random number draw that has a mean closest to zero.
1.2.5 Estimates
From our three asset return series; housing, stocks, and risk-free, we compute
the covariances and correlations between them in Excel. The results, together
with mean returns and standard deviations, are summarised in Table 1.6.28
Note that these are obviously not forecasts or “proper” econometric estimates,
the latter would require much more sophisticated tools that those employed
here, but they should be fairly representative for the 1992-2006 period.
Our numbers are almost in perfect harmony with Harding et al.’s (2004)
corresponding table. This is of course not very surprising given that we are
considering the same economy over a similar time period. The only notable
28The standard deviation of the risk-free asset is of course zero by assumption, but we are
including the observed figure here for comparison’s sake.
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diﬀerence is their higher estimate on stock market standard deviation (0.31).
Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Englund et al. (2002) and Goetzmann (1993)
however, all report negative or zero correlation between single housing return
and stock market return. This stands in sharp contrast to our result of a signifi-
cant 0.33. Further, Flavin and Yamashita’s mean returns on housing and stocks
for 1968-1992 are much lower than ours; 0.066 and 0.082 respectively. Without
trying to provide a proper explanation for this seeming inconsistency, we may
note that all three papers above consider time periods ending roughly as ours
start, the early 1990s, thus not picking up the recent boom in both real estate
and stock prices.29 We will see below that the period we have chosen is in fact
extraordinary in a longer perspective.
Since we have included a random disturbance term in the housing series we
might suspect this component to be contributing to the stock market correla-
tion. After all, stock market return fluctuations are not all that diﬀerent from
the movements of such a disturbance variable.30 We find however, that the
correlation without adding the disturbance to the housing series is 0.43. Hence,
our method for incorporating idiosyncratic risk has reduced the housing return’s
correlation with other asset returns (as expected and intended).
Historical perspective
We briefly discussed the development of prices on stocks and housing in the
Introduction and it became clear that the years since 1992 have mostly been
a period of tremendous growth in both markets. Hence, the 1992-2006 period
should produce unusually high return estimates for stocks and housing. We
will therefore conduct a somewhat informal investigation of the time before and
after 1992 using historical data on housing- and stock prices, and on historical
real bond rates.31 For 1920-200632 we calculate real annual (assumed risk-free)
bond rates and house- and stock price growth rates. Note that we only consider
prices for housing and stocks since we do not have stock market dividend data
for the long period.
For the risk-free asset we find that the before-tax real return was roughly
2.3% for 1920-1991 against 3.5% for 1992-2006.33 As the standard deviation
was 6.2% for the former period we can safely say it was not very risk-free, but,
as expected, most of this can be attributed to inflation volatility: inflation’s
standard deviation was actually slightly higher at 6.23%.
29Himmelberg et al. (2004) and Shiller (2005).
30 In fact, we will assume below that the returns are indeed normally distributed!
31Annual time series collected from Klovland (2004a), Klovland (2004b), and Eitrheim and
Erlandsen (2004). Inflation series from Grytten (2004).
32We choose 1920 since this is the first year of the bond series. For housing- and stock
prices we have data from 1819 and 1914 respectively, but we will stick to 1920 here as well.
33This is a bit lower than what we found above when we did it “properly,” and the discrep-
ancy is presumably due to the coarser historical data and to diﬀerent types of bonds being
included each aggregate.
1.2. ASSET RETURNS 17
Housing Stocks Risk-free Inflation
∆ mean 0.081 0.133 0.012 -0.014




Risk-free -0.557 -0.631 1.000
Inflation -0.552 -0.614 -0.089 1.000
Table 1.7: Diﬀerence between periods 1920-1991 and 1992-2006. Note: Prices
only for housing and stocks. The values in the correlation matrix are in nominal
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Figure 1.4: Real housing- and stock price indices normalised with 100 as long-
run mean. Smoothed annual observations. Source: Statistics Norway and own
calculations.
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Housing- and stock prices both show surprisingly low real growth in the
long-run: 0.6% and 0.2% respectively for the 1920-1991 period. Figure 1.4 plots
the real, normalised price level of housing and stocks, and it shows clearly how
strong the growth has been since the mid-1990s. From our price data we find
mean real capital returns to be 8.7% and 13.6% for housing and stocks34 over
1992-2006, and we can thus conclude that the previous section’s estimates are
not at all in line with historical long-run averages.
Table 1.7 shows the diﬀerence between the 1992-2006 and 1920-1991 periods
in terms of means, standard deviations, and correlations. The latter is particu-
larly interesting since we ran into some diﬀerences with prominent papers above
concerning the correlation between housing- and stock market return. We now
find that the two prices are vastly more correlated in the later period than in
the long-run: for 1920-1991 the statistic is a modest 0.027 against 0.413 for
1992-2006. Apart from a stock market slump around 2003, we see from Figure
1.4 that both prices “took oﬀ” almost simultaneously in the mid-nineties. No
wonder why newer correlation estimates are higher!
Moreover, the correlations in Table 1.7 are for nominal series so that we can
control for the impact of inflation. We see that the correlations between real
housing- and stock prices and the risk-free rate were much stronger in the long
period due mostly to inflation movements. Background data shows that real
housing- and stock price growth had correlations with the real risk-free rate of
0.41 and 0.11 respectively in the long period, and 0.23 and -0.1 in the 1992-2006
period.
34As stressed earlier, these figures cannot be compared to those we found in the previous
section as we are now using diﬀerent data sets, we are not including dividends, and we are
not adjusting for taxes.
Chapter 2
Static portfolio model
The discussion in this chapter will make use of a central assumption in financial
economics, namely that an investor composes a portfolio of assets based only on
the latters’ expected returns and expected variance. It is further assumed that
the investor is risk averse so that higher risk (in the form of greater portfolio
variance) must be compensated with higher expected return. Further, the model
presented in the first section is a static model. This means that the investor is
assumed to treat all periods the same such that a general optimisation problem
is reduced to a study of the single period problem. This might not be very
realistic but it can nevertheless deliver some valuable insights into households’
behaviour.
2.1 A simple mean-variance framework
We will use the simplest possible framework in our analysis of the household
asset allocation decision. In setting up a very basic mean-variance finance model
for portfolio selection, we will follow Danthine and Donaldson’s (2005) textbook
and their approach. Let us first assume that only two risky assets, housing
and stocks, are available for the household. The asset returns, rh and rs, are
modelled as random variables with some expected value and some variance.
Any combination of these two will be called the risky portfolio, and has a total
return of
rp = wrh + (1− w)rs,
where w is the portfolio weight on the housing asset. We write the first two
moments of the portfolio return as
E(rp) ≡ μp = wμh + (1− w)μs,
V ar(rp) ≡ σ2p = w2σ2h + (1− w)2σ2s + 2w(1− w)σhs,
using the standard rules. The expected return is thus the weighted average of the
expected returns of the two assets, while the portfolio variance may be smaller
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or greater than the weighted average depending on the two assets’ covariance.
If the latter is negative we see that the benefit from diversification is a reduction
in portfolio variance (i.e., risk).
The investor household will seek the weight on the housing asset, w, that




w2σ2h + (1− w)2σ2s + 2w(1− w)σhs
ª
s.t. wμh + (1− w)μs = μp.
That is, by fixing μp at various values while minimising the variance, we obtain
points in mean-variance space that trace out the frontier of feasible portfolios.
The problem’s constraint yields
w(μh − μs) = μp − μs ⇐⇒ w =
μp − μs
μh − μs






s − 2σhs) +
μp − μs
μh − μs
(σhs − σ2s)2 + σ2s.
To find the shape of the parabola (or the hyperbola)2 of risky portfolios it
will be useful to rearrange this into a clearer function of μp, the portfolio return,
and some constants. It is shown in Appendix A that we can write
σ2p(μp) = Aμ
2
p +Bμp + C or σp(μp) =
q



























Aμ2p +Bμp + C
by diﬀerentiating Equation (2.1).
1Alternatively, the household would seek the weight that maximised the expected return
given some portfolio variance. These two formulations are equivalent since they both define
the trade-oﬀ between return and risk.
2The bullet-shaped portfolio frontier in the (μ, σ2) plane (or, the curve representing avail-
able portfolios for diﬀerent values of expected return and variance) is called a parabola. When
we consider the (μ, σ) plane, it is called a hyperbola.
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Figure 2.1: Hyperbola of portfolios and the capital market line as produced
by the estimates in Table 1.6. Expected return on the vertical axis, standard
deviation on the horizontal axis.
2.1.1 The capital market line
Next, we introduce a risk-free asset with predetermined return rf . The hold-
ings are here allowed to be both negative and positive.3 The portfolio frontier
will now be a straight line from (0, rf ) through (σT , μT ) in the (σ, μ) plane,
called the capital market line (CML). As we see from Figure 2.1, (σT , μT ) is the
tangency point between the straight line beaming from (0, rf ) and the bullet-
shaped hyperbola, and we may refer to it as the market portfolio. The diﬀerence
quotient of the CML is4
σT
μT − rf







Aμ2T +BμT + C
. (2.2)
3As we have not imposed any non-negativity constraints on the portfolio weights of housing
and stocks, w and 1 − w, we are actually allowing holdings of these assets to be negative as
well. This is clearly not a reasonable assumption for the housing asset, but it is necessary
if we want to find an analytical result. Fortunately though, the optimal holdings of housing
(and stocks) turn out to be positive in our calculations below. Otherwise we would have had
to resort to a numerical solution with the non-negativity constraints imposed.
4Danthine and Donaldson (2005:122).
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Since Equation (2.1) holds for any point on the hyperbola, we can write
σT (μT ) =
q
Aμ2T +BμT + C. (2.3)
Together, (2.2) and (2.3) determines the tangency point (σT , μT ) and thus





which we will employ below to find the actual tangency point using our data
and estimates. Note now that we are able to locate the market portfolio without
knowing the individual household’s preferences. The two-fund separation the-
orem (Danthine and Donaldson, 2005) ensures that any investor, regardless of
risk preference, will choose a portfolio that is a combination of the risky market
portfolio (σT , μT ) and the risk-free asset. The individual household’s degree
of risk aversion will thus determine the proportion of risky assets in the total
portfolio.
2.1.2 Household preferences
In order for us to determine the household’s preferred portfolio in the frame-
work above, preferences must be represented by a function of any portfolio’s
expected return and standard deviation. To achieve this we must either as-
sume a quadratic utility function or that asset returns are normally distributed.
The former assumption is undesirable because it implies putting a restriction
on the portfolio return to avoid negative marginal utility, and because it yields
an increasing coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.6 The normality assumption
is not consistent with limited liability since it may very well predict a return
below negative 100%. But, if we instead assume that it is the continuously
compounded returns that are normally distributed, the problem is evaded.
Before we discuss this any further, suppose the household’s preferences can




where γ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. Equation (2.5)
implies constant relative risk aversion ,γ, meaning that the household is assumed
to invest the same proportion of total wealth in risky assets regardless of its
5 Intermediate calculations are available in Appendix A.
6This is not realistic, decreasing absolute risk aversion is actually more consistent with
data.
7The treatment of the CRRA utility funtion in this section follows to a considerable extent
Söderlind’s (2007) lecture note on finance theory.
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Figure 2.2: Household indiﬀerence curve and the capital market line as produced
by the estimates in Table 1.6. Expected return on the vertical axis, standard
deviation on the horizontal axis.
actual level of wealth. This is a fairly reasonable assumption as long as the
changes in wealth do not become too large (Varian, 1992).8
The continuously compounded portfolio return is written rˆp = ln(1 + rp) so
that 1 + rp = exp(rˆp). Equation (2.5) then becomes
u(rˆp) =
e(1−γ)rˆp
1− γ . (2.6)
Of course, the assumption above implies that the asset returns are log-
normally9 distributed, but the sum of two (or more) such random variables
is not log-normally distributed. Log-normal distribution of the portfolio return
should however, work just fine as an approximation to the true distribution
8We did see in Table 1.4 above that the share of risky stocks in the household portfolio
remained unchanged from the second to the third wealth quartile. From the third to the
fourth quartile however, the share of stocks rose over five times.
9A very informal test provides some justification for this assumption: histograms of real
growth rates of the housing price (HPI) and the Oslo Stock Exchange benchmark index show
distributions not that far from the typical log-normal, skewed pdf. Using the quarterly series’
mentioned in Chapter 1 we find that both housing and stocks lean heavily to the right, but
with significant negative observations. In fact, the stocks data is farther from a log-normal
shape than the housing data. However, since the assumption of log-normally distributed stock
market return is common in the literature, and since the housing returns seem to be even closer
to the said distribution, we will maintain the above assumption in good conscience.
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(whatever that might be), and it will allow us to use the CRRA utility function
rather than a less realistic formulation.10












Next, perform the transformation
ln (E [u(rˆp)] · (1− γ))




which is defined for E [u(rˆp)] < 0 when γ > 1. We can then say that the righ-
hand side of Equation (2.7) represents the expected utility from the continuously
compounded portfolio return. Next, when rˆp = ln(1+rp) ∼ N(μˆp, σˆ2p), we must
have
E(1 + rp) = eμˆp+
σˆ2
2 ,









sd(1 + rp) = E(1 + rp) ·
p
eσˆ2 − 1,



















Inserting from Equations (2.8) and (2.9) in Equation (2.7) yields


























10Expected utility is actually not defined when we use the CRRA functional form together
with normally distributed portfolio returns so we are forced to relax at least one of the desired
assumptions.
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γ = 5 γ = 6 γ = 7 γ = 8 γ = 10 γ = 12 γ = 14 γ = 16
μc 0.313 0.233 0.191 0.163 0.130 0.110 0.097 0.088
σc 0.317 0.227 0.180 0.149 0.112 0.090 0.075 0.065
wh 1.177 0.844 0.670 0.553 0.416 0.333 0.279 0.241
ws 1.195 0.857 0.680 0.562 0.422 0.338 0.283 0.245
wf -1.372 -0.702 -0.350 -0.115 0.162 0.329 0.438 0.514
Table 2.1: Expected portfolio return, standard deviation, and portfolio weights
as produced by the estimates in Table 1.6.
Equation (2.10) is now a utility function in the mean-variance plane of the
portfolio return, and will be used to determine optimal portfolio allocations for
the household. Figure 2.2 shows the indiﬀerence curve for γ = 6 together with
the capital market line, based on the estimates in Table 1.6.
2.2 Optimal portfolio allocations





which, inserted in Eqation (2.4), produce μT = 0.1493 as well. With these
four ingredients we find from Equation (2.3) that σT = 0.1335. As mentioned
earlier, the slope of the tangent, and thus also the capital market line, is given
by σT /(μT − rf ) in the (σ, μ) plane. Inverting this, we know that the capital
market line must be, in the (μ, σ) plane, given by




μc = 0.03 + 0.8936 · σc. (2.11)
From Equation (2.11) we find the (μc, σc) pairs that make up the CML for
0.03 ≤ μc ≤ 0.4 in Microsoft Excel. To find the optimal points on this line
according to the utility function in Equation (2.10), we search for the points
giving the highest level of utility for various degrees of relative risk aversion
(i.e., when the indiﬀerence curves are tangent to the capital market line, as in
Figure 2.2). The results are reported in the upper half of Table 2.1.
Any portfolio on the CML will be a combination of the risky tangency port-
folio (μT , σT ) and the risk-free asset. The weight on housing in the tangency
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Figure 2.3: Optimal portfolio shares for diﬀerent degrees of relative risk aversion
with return estimates based on actual asset returns over 1992-2006.








That is, the optimal portfolio should consist of slightly more stocks than housing.
From Table 1.2 we know that this is a far cry from the observed holdings where
the corresponding housing-to-stocks share was a whopping 0.93.11 Even the
households with the largest proportion of stocks in their portfolios, those in
the fourth wealth quartile (Table 1.4), had a housing share as high as 0.89. It
thus appears that people, given our return estimates, hold way too little equity
relative to housing.12
Denote the overall weight of the risk-free asset by wf so that the total
portfolio weights on housing and stocks can be written wh ≡ (1 − wf )w and
11From Table 1.2: w = whwh+ws =
1.175
1.264 = 0.93.
12Of course, as we mentioned in Section 1.1.1, stock holdings may have been unusually low
around 2002 so the discrepancy might be somewhat exaggerated here.
2.2. OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO ALLOCATIONS 27
ws ≡ (1− wf )(1− w) respectively. From the total expected return we find
μc = whμh + wsμs + wfrf
= (1− wf )wμh + (1− wf )(1− w)μs + wfrf
= (1− wf ) · 0.1493 + wf · 0.03
= 0.1493− wf · 0.1193,
so that we obtain a weight on the risk-free asset for every point along the capital





The total weights on housing and stocks follow trivially and are presented
in the lower half of Table 2.1, and illustated in Figure 2.3. We see again that
the fit with data is generally poor due to the housing- and stocks shares being
virtually equal in the optimal portfolios. However, the optimal portfolios with
lower relative risk aversion13 tend to give a better description of young portfo-
lios (Table 1.3), while higher risk aversion portfolios better fit older household
observations. Further, wealthier households are by far the closest to “optimum”
(Table 1.4) as they hold quite a lot of stocks relative to their other holdings.
2.2.1 Allocations with older estimates
It is clear that the static portfolio model is unable to explain the observed house-
hold behaviour given the return estimates found in Chapter 1, alternatively that
households are dramatically underinvesting in the equity market. Regardless,
we saw above that the 1992-2006 period was pretty unusual return-wise, and
it should therefore be interesting to find the optimal portfolios given some ex-
pected returns14 based on pre-1992 data as well. Perhaps most households’
beliefs about asset returns are lagged by a few years (or even decades)?
We mentioned in Chapter 1 that we have data (at least) all the way back
to 1920 on housing- and stock prices, bond rates, and on inflation. But, since
our data on stock market dividends only dates back to 1966, we will seek the
optimal portfolio based on the asset returns over 1966-1991.
The annual mean stock price appreciation rate was 0.084 in this period,
while the dividend rate was fairly stable at 0.065. Assuming a 0.28 tax rate on
capital gains only, we find a nominal, annual rate of return of 0.125. What is
possibly most remarkable about this period compared to 1992-2006, apart from
the lower nominal returns, is the high rate of inflation. From Statistics Norway
13The lowest degree of relative risk aversion reported in Table 2.3, 5, is not really low, but
the portfolios from degree 4 and lower are literally “oﬀ the chart” due to the slope of the
capital market line.
14Expectations and beliefs about future returns are not really the topics here, but we have
in a way implied that the 1992-2006 means are expectations formed around 2002 as they are
in part based on then historical returns (1992-2001), and in part on future returns (2002-2006)
which we must assume was expected to some extent.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal portfolio shares for diﬀerent degrees of relative risk aversion
with return estimates based on actual asset returns over 1966-1991.
data we find an annual mean inflation rate of 0.066. This yields a mean, real,
after-tax rate of return of 0.06 for stocks. The standard deviation of this series
was 0.18, slightly lower than for the 1992-2006 sample.
The housing price index grew on average at a nominal rate of 0.082 over
the “historical” period, and, adjusted for inflation, we get 0.016 real growth
per year. We will maintain the assumption from Chapter 1 of 4% real, annual
housing dividends so that the total rate of return to housing can be set to 0.056.
We will also assume that the housing risk-to-stock market risk ratio still is 0.6
so that the housing return has a standard deviation of 0.11, and further that
the covariance between housing and stocks now is zero. The latter assumption
provides a stronger incentive for diversification and is in line with the discussion
at the end of Chapter 1.
For bonds we actually find a slightly negative real return over 1966-1991,
but we will need this to be positive in our model so we “compromise” and set a
real after-tax rate of 0.02 instead.
Going through exactly the same steps15 as in we did above, we end up with
the portfolio shares reported in Table 2.2 and in Figure 2.4 and with w = 0.7.
The latter is much higher than in the “standard” case and it will presumably
close some of the gap between observed and optimal holdings.
Going back to Table 1.4 we see that the holdings of the fourth quartile
15Details are available in Appendix A.
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γ = 2 γ = 3 γ = 5 γ = 7 γ = 9 γ = 11
μc 0.120 0.080 0.054 0.044 0.038 0.035
σc 0.254 0.153 0.084 0.061 0.046 0.038
wh 1.882 1.129 0.640 0.452 0.339 0.282
ws 0.806 0.484 0.274 0.194 0.145 0.121
wf -1.688 -0.613 0.086 0.355 0.516 0.597
Table 2.2: Optimal portfolio shares from the older return estimates (1966-1991)
listed in Table A.1 of Appendix A.
households match the optimal portfolio with a relative risk aversion degree of 5
quite well, even though the observed portfolios contain too little equity. Further,
we se that the third and second quartile holdings fit better with the γ = 4 and
γ = 2 portfolios respectively, and it certainly seems like we are on to something:
richer households seems to be more risk averse than poorer households, and
perhaps more importantly for us, the older return estimates (or beliefs) can
explain a lot more than the newer figures.
The latter is possibly an indication that households’ beliefs are outdated or
somehow out of line with the true observed returns. We have seen that a lower
real interest rate is a better match with people’s actual behaviour: perhaps
households have not fully accounted for the lower inflation in recent years? If
households believe in a higher rate of inflation, they also believe in lower real
interest rates and lower real returns on stocks and housing. We mentioned above
that inflation has been, in a historical perspective, quite low since the early
1990s; maybe we can attribute some of the discrepancy between the model’s
predictions in the previous section and the observed behaviour to beliefs of
higher inflation?
We have also seen (in Chapter 1) that the real price appreciation of stocks
has been very low over the long-run: perhaps households underestimate the
stock market return? After all, stock prices are the “visible” part of the stock
return, while dividends may be more unknown (at least for those who have no
experience from investing in the market).
When it comes to housing it is now important to remember that this type of
asset is not just like any other financial asset: it is not liquid (so it is costly and
even diﬃcult to adjust) and holdings of it is much more likely to be driven by its
consumption properties than its function as an asset. It is obviously unrealistic
to assume that people constantly adjust their amount of living space according
to expected price movements, but if they think (real) prices will only go up and
up, they may very well upgrade or buy more at entrance.
2.2.2 Allocations with binding housing constraints
In Table 1.3 we found that the share of housing varies dramatically across co-
horts, from 2.85 for the youngest to 0.74 for the oldest. Flavin and Yamashita
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(2002) argue that the households’ housing holdings are mainly determined by
the housing consumption demand, and that the portfolio problem thus is con-
strained by this share. They go on to compute the optimal portfolios for each
cohort given the corresponding housing share observed in the data. We will
extend our model in the same spirit and try to find cohort portfolios when
spending on housing is exogenously given.
First, if we assume wh given and include the risk-free asset in the original














f + 2w¯hwsσhs + 2w¯hwfσhf + 2wswfσsf
ª
s.t. w¯hμh + wsμs + wfrf = μp.
This can be simplified if we assume that the risk-free asset is not correlated
with neither housing nor stocks16 and that it is indeed risk-free (zero variance).







h + (1− w¯h − wf )2σ2s + 2w¯h(1− w¯h − wf )σhs
ª
s.t. w¯hμh + (1− w¯h − wf )μs + wfrf = μp.
From the constraint we solve for the weight on the risk-free asset,
wf (rf − μs) = μp − w¯hμh − μs + w¯hμs,
wf =
μp + w¯h(μs − μh)− μs
rf − μs
,
and insert the expression into the portfolio variance:


















We will now get a unique hyperbola for each w¯h, and, by searching for
points on the hyperbolas that give the greatest utility for, say, γ = 6,17 we
obtain optimal constrained portfolios for each cohort. The resulting portfolio
weights are presented in the upper half of Table 2.3. The first thing we notice
with this table is that households, given the amount held of housing, ”should”
be investing absurdly heavily in equity and borrow huge amounts of money for
financing. Obviously, households will never be able to build up this kind of debt
due to credit limitations and to the fact that equity cannot serve as collateral.
For instance, it is not particularly plausible that the oldest cohort could (or
should) have loans outweighing their housing assets over three times.
16This is very reasonable given our results from Table 1.5.
17We saw above that γ = 5 gave the housing share closest to that in the data while γ = 7
gave the closest debt share; it thus seems reasonable to run with γ = 6.
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-24 25-34 35-44 44-54 55-66 67-79 80-
w¯h 2.848 2.607 1.492 1.132 0.959 0.801 0.736
ws 1.583 1.680 2.156 2.269 2.306 2.348 2.355
wf -3.431 -3.287 -2.648 -2.401 -2.265 -2.149 -2.355
wcs 1.000 1.000 0.953 0.819 0.780 0.797 0.830
wcf -2.848 -2.607 -1.445 -0.951 -0.739 -0.598 -0.566
Table 2.3: Portfolio weights on stocks and risk-free given the weights on housing
by cohorts. 1992-2006 return estimates. Note: The upper half of the table
reports the unconstrained analytical solution, while the lower half reports the
results from a numerical solution with credit constraints.
In order to get anywhere with this, we will have to impose some sort of credit
constraint reflecting the fact that debt is limited (at least) by the holdings of
real assets, say
wf + (1− φ)wh ≥ 0,
where φ represents the required mortgage prepayment. Unfortunately, we can-
not incorporate this constraint analytically; we will have to resort to a numerical
method. We will employ a simple procedure from Chen et al. (2008) and solve
exactly the same problem as we laid out above, but now with wf +wh ≥ 0 im-
posed.18 For each w¯h, we first minimise total portfolio variance given a guess on
the required portfolio return so that we obtain a few points in mean-variance (or
mean-standard deviation) space. These points then trace out the constrained
portfolio frontiers. Given γ = 6 we find the best point for each w¯h by trying all
points on the frontiers in the utility function. Using Excel’s Solver function we
then find the optimal weights on stocks and risk-free given all w¯h. A detailed
description of this procedure is available in Appendix B.
The numerical results are presented in the lower half of Table 2.3. We see
that households overall borrow nearly as much as they can, but, since they are
credit constrained, have a far more reasonable life-cycle profile than under the
unconstrained solution. From looking at Figure 2.5 it is clear that the match
with data again is poor: true, households’ actual borrowing has much of the
same profile as in the model, but there is a significant discrepancy in magnitude.
Further, the model prescribes large equity holdings for all w¯h, dwarfing the
observed allocations. Are people perhaps more risk averse than we think? Are
housing risk really crowding out stock holdings (as we mentioned in Chapter
1)? Or, could we find another explanation?
Since our results in the previous section was quite encouraging, we will run
through our numerical procedure with the “older” 1966-1991 return estimates
as well. The method is still described in Appendix B so we will just report the
results here.
From Figure 2.6 and Table 2.4 we see that the match now is close to perfect:
optimal stock holdings are still a bit higher than in the data, but the discrepancy
18We assume φ = 0 for simplicity and plausability.
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Figure 2.5: Performance of the constrained model with newer estimates by age
cohorts. Portfolio shares of the model vs. Norwegian household observations.
is negligible compared to our earlier results, while optimal debt is dead on almost
all the way. The fit seems best for the young households. The observed older
household portfolios are in a way “safer” since the holdings of stocks are lower
and the positive net holdings of risk-free are higher there than in the model.
This makes good sense when we remember that we have assumed a relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient of 6 for all cohorts, and that our earlier results indicated
that older portfolios generally are products of higher degrees of risk aversion.
The life-cycle predictions of the portfolio choice model is thus that
(. . . ) young households with high values of [wh] are forced by
their high degree of leverage to hold a risky portfolio and therefore
-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-66 67-79 80-
Housing 2.848 2.607 1.492 1.132 0.959 0.801 0.736
Stocks 0.121 0.117 0.077 0.064 0.064 0.037 0.022
Risk-free -1.969 -1.724 -0.568 -0.229 -0.023 0.162 0.243
wcs 0.187 0.154 0.157 0.231 0.262 0.154 0.213
wcf -2.035 -1.761 -0.650 -0.363 -0.221 0.045 0.051
Table 2.4: Actual portfolio shares (upper half) vs. the prescriptions of the
constrained model with older estimates (lower half). The 1966-1991 return
estimates are listed in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.6: Performance of the constrained model with older estimates by age
cohorts. Portfolio shares of the model vs. Norwegian household observations.
use their net worth to reduce portfolio risk rather than attempting
to further increase their expected return. To reduce portfolio risk,
the young households hold only a small to moderate share (. . . ) of
stocks, and reduce their leverage, either explicitly by paying down
the mortgage, or implicitly by keeping the 100-percent mortgage and
simultaneously holding bonds. As wealth accumulates and the value
of [wh] falls, the household shifts a greater fraction of its financial
assets into stocks. (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002:355)
That is, the static model considered in this chapter can, with a few adjust-
ments, explain and justify the compositions of households’ portfolios. In Chap-
ter 1 we noticed that these portfolios were much undiversified and contained
little equity. Here however, we have seen that, given the pecuniary assumption
on housing dividends, such allocations are perfectly rational for households be-
lieving in certain asset properties. Trouble is, these beliefs are not consistent
with actual asset properties around the time of the portfolio observations. It
seems like people either disregard the tremendous returns of the nineties and
early noughties as extraordinary and unsustainable, or that they enjoy even
greater utility from housing than what we have accounted for in our eﬀorts.
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2.2.3 The omission of human capital
It should now be mentioned that a central issue in connection to households’
risk behaviour and asset holdings has been omitted in the present discussion,
namely that of human capital. This is innate to the portfolio choice model,
but nonetheless unfortunate since we may avoid some major insights. The
household members’ ability to earn labour income is usually the key determinant
in securing consumption goods and other services, and the holdings of real- and
financial assets. Naturally, a household with more human capital can borrow
more money, buy more housing, and hold more stocks. The income stream is
inherently uncertain and it will thus influence the amount of risk one is willing
to be exposed to in the housing- and equity market. Cocco (2005) simulates a
dynamic life-cycle model and finds that human capital accounts for 87% of young
households’ total assets and for 21% for the oldest households. As human capital
is measured by the expected discounted future value of one’s labour income,
this is not surprising. An immediate implication is that young households have
riskier total “portfolios” from the outset and should thus be less willing to invest
in other risky assets such as housing and stocks. However,
the ability to get a better paid job or a new job if the current job is
lost will probably decrease with age. So risk related to human capital
might actually increase with age. If this is the case, willingness to
invest financial capital in risky assets should fall with age. (Harding
et al., 2004:18)
Yet, the latter paper’s results suggest that households do become more risk
averse with age; essentially the same conclusion as we arrived at above.
Cocco’s paper further divides the simulated households into a high-income
group and a low-income group, and finds that the former’s human capital share is
53% while the latter’s share is 73%. That is, high-income households’ expected
future income constitutes a smaller fraction of total assets than that of low-
income households. This may sound curious at first but has a straightforward
interpretation: those enjoying high labour incomes should be more likely to
have money “left over” for investments in real- and financial capital and, as
wealth accumulates over time, their human capital becomes less dominating in
the total portfolio. Poorer households on the other hand, may not be able to
set as much aside for the future and are thus forced to maintain a very high
human capital share and accept the added uncertainty to their total portfolio.
This is consistent with our findings in Table 1.4 above: wealthier households




In the previous chapter we used a static model and basically assumed that the
household treated every period individually. Regardless of age and income, the
household based its investment decisions on expected returns and expected risk
only. In the present chapter however, we are interested in how the household
behaves over the life-cycle when past decisions matter for current and future
utility. How will the allocations in such an environment diﬀer from those pre-
scribed by the static model? Can we perhaps enable ourselves to more accurately
explain or rationalise the observed behaviour with an alternative formulation?
To these ends we will employ a simple yet powerful dynamic model. The model
is standard and follows mostly Adda and Cooper (2003), Rust (2006), Krusell
(2004) and Krueger (2005), but we will nevertheless take the time to provide
some basic intuition of the central ideas.
3.1 Theoretical framework
Suppose that the household lives for T periods and that it in each period receives
utility from regular consumption and from consuming housing services. We
denote the period utility by
u(ct, ht+1),
where ct is consumption at time t and ht+1 is the amount of housing service
available for consumption at time t. The reason why we have equipped the
latter with subscript t+1 is that we in a moment will define this as the amount
of housing bought at time t, and sold at time t+ 1. This of course implies that
we assume all households here to be homeowners. Following Cocco (2004) this
is justified by further assuming that owning is strictly preferred to renting due
to market frictions. We briefly touched upon this issue in the previous chapters
and remarked there that these frictions may be identified as inflated rents owed
to moral hazard and as tax benefits to the owner-occupier.
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Since we are interested in the whole life-cycle we write the expected dis-








where β is the period-to-period discount factor. Equation (3.1) is thus the
expected lifetime utility to the household at time 1. If the maximisation of
(3.1) is defined as our objective, it is clear that future well-being matters for the
optimal adjustment in the initial period and in all subsequent periods. Further,
assume that the household faces roughly the same world of options as in Chapter
2, specifically that it can invest in housing and stocks, and hold positive or
negative amounts of a risk-free asset. We can then write the time t budget
constraint as




t = yt, (3.2)
where yt is some exogenously given labour income while iht , ist and ibt are the
amounts invested in housing, stocks and risk-free. We will hereafter refer to
the latter as “bonds,” but the meaning and interpretation is the same as in the
previous chapters. The investments made in the three assets are equal to the
diﬀerences between holdings in the current- and the next period:
iht = ht+1 − (1− δ)(1 + rht )ht, (3.3)
ist = st+1 − (1 + rst )st, (3.4)
ibt = bt+1 − (1 + rf )bt. (3.5)
Here, δ is the depreciation of the housing holdings, rf is still the real risk-
free rate, while rht and r
s
t are the real rates of return on housing and stocks
respectively. Note that rht now just embodies the capital gain component of
the housing return since the consumption benefit is accounted for in the utility
function. Inserting Equations (3.3)-(3.5) into (3.2) yields the household’s budget
constraint:
ct + ht+1 + st+1 + bt+1 = yt + (1− δ)(1 + rht )ht + (1+ rst )st + (1+ rf )bt. (3.6)
Together with non-negativity constraints1 on consumption, housing and stocks,
and with the credit constraint mentioned in Section 2.2.2, we formulate the










subject to Equation (3.6) and to
ct ≥ 0, ht+1 ≥ 0, st+1 ≥ 0 (3.8)
bt+1 + (1− φ)ht+1 ≥ 0. (3.9)
1The requirement that regular consumption and housing service consumption should be
non-negative is trivial. The non-negativity constraint on stocks however, is to prevent short
sales.
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That is, the household seeks to optimally allocate its period t resources between
consumption and the three available assets. The “resources” are current period
labour income plus the current value of the assets obtained in the previous
period. The amount2 of housing bought at time t, ht+1, is at the household’s
disposal for consumption purposes from the beginning of time t till the beginning
of time t + 1, when it is assumed sold. Naturally, if the household wishes to
continue to receive housing services, it must acquire the then desired amount of
housing asset at the beginning of time t+ 1.
Note that we, for tractability, abstract from adjustment- transaction- and
entrance costs in this setting. This is not particularly realistic but it makes the
analysis of life-cycle allocations much easier.
The returns on housing and stocks are still stochastic but now we assume
that
rht ∼ N(μh, σh) and rst ∼ N(μs, σs),
where the first two moments are known from our earlier discussion. For com-
putational convenience we further assume that the returns are not correlated
with each other (even though we found this to be the case in the Chapter 1
estimates).3
3.1.1 Household preferences
As before we will identify the form of the utility function as that of constant
relative risk aversion, but we will also have to find a way to incorporate housing
consumption. Fortunately, this is easily done by the Cobb-Douglas aggregator







1− γ , (3.10)
where θ is the weight on housing consumption in total consumption. Notice the
diﬀerence between this specification and that in Chapter 2: first, we now care
directly about consumption rather than indirectly via the portfolio return; and
second, the whole distributions of ct and ht+1 matter, not just their first two
moments.
2The denomination of the variables in the present setup is money value so that, say, ht+1
is the cost of housing bought at time t. Thus, adjusting the amount of housing does not
necessarily imply adjusting the household’s living space: a relative price increase from one
period to the next means an increase in the household’s holdings of housing even if their
dwelling is the same throughout.
3To incorporate covariance between the housing- and stock returns in the numerical proce-
dure below, we would have had to discretisise multivariate probability distributions. Although
this is not conceptually or technically diﬃcult, it would, without the employment of sophis-
ticated interpolation methods, have required a great deal more computer power (which is
definitely a scarce resource for some).
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3.1.2 Solution concept
The problem in (3.7)-(3.9) generally has a sequence of numbers for all the vari-
ables as its solution, but this solution is very diﬃcult, and perhaps even impos-
sible, to obtain analytically through, for example, the Kuhn-Tucker procedure
(Rust, 2006). The reason is that the solution to, say, ht+1 depends on the
full history of this and the other variables. Keeping track of optimal invest-
ment strategies for all possible histories, for all periods of the problem, will be
extremely challenging. When we further note that the variables can take on
any value and that the states of the world are inherently uncertain, the task
immediately becomes impracticable.
Therefore, we will take the approach of dynamic programming to get some
answers out of our specification in (3.6)-(3.9). A second glance at the latter
problem reveals the key to the procedure: the household’s problem is essen-
tially the same in every period. That is, at each time t < T the objective is
to maximise remaining lifetime utility given the constraints, and given the re-
sources brought into the current period from the previous period. We define the
household’s value function as
v(ht, st, bt, rht , r
s




where ct is determined by (3.6). Equation (3.11) is then the value of behaving
optimally given the left-hand side variables.4 Since ht, st and bt depend on
past decisions they are called endogenous state variables. On the other hand,
rht , rst , yt and time itself do not depend on the household’s past actions and are
therefore referred to as the exogenous state variables.
It can be shown, for instance as in Krusell (2004), that (3.11) implies the
Bellman equation,
v(ht, st, bt, rht , r
s
t , yt, t) = maxht+1,st+1,bt+1




subject to Equations (3.6), (3.8) and (3.9). It is then clear that the household is
optimising by investing (and consuming) optimally by deciding on the values of
ht+1, st+1 and bt+1, the control variables, in each period. Consumption follows
from the budget constraint it is thus not truly a control variable. The discount
factor, β, determines how much weight to put on immediate utility, u(ct, ht+1),
and how much to put on future utility, v(•, t+1). Now, had we known the form
of this value function, v(•), the solution could have been very straightforward:
beginning in period 1, plug in the known state and maximise current and future
utility by picking the optimal controls. Sadly, this is not the way of the world.
Once again however, we will see that a numerical procedure comes to rescue.
4The indirect utility function (Varian, 1992).
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3.1.3 Partial equilibrium
Thanks to the contraction mapping theorem (Adda and Cooper, 2003), we know
that there exists a unique value function that helps solve the Bellman equation
(3.12). By first making a guess on v(•, t + 1) we obtain a new value function,
Tv(•, t), from (3.12). Then we update the right-hand side of the Bellman by
setting v = Tv and find Tv once again. This updating is continued until the
two functional forms on each side of the equality sign converge. That is, we are
performing value function iterations.
Once we have settled on the value function, the optimal controls are deduced
for all possible states of the world. These behaviour recipes are called decision
rules as they prescribe the optimal actions given any state. The principle of
optimality ensures that these rules are valid for all periods of the problem (Rust,
2006).
Since we are only considering the economy from the household’s point of
view, we are looking for a partial equilibrium solution5 in which the allocations
solve the household’s problem. Fortunately, the model setup above guarantees
that such a solution exist and that it is unique since (i) the utility function
is concave and since (ii) the set of possible realisations of the variables are
convex (Varian, 1992).6 It further follows from above that this equilibrium is
characterised by a value function and a set of decision rules. Given the state
variables, we thus have
v∗(ht, st, bt, rht , r
s
t , yt, t),
h∗t+1 = h
∗(ht, st, bt, rht , r
s
t , yt, t),
s∗t+1 = s
∗(ht, st, bt, rht , r
s
t , yt, t),
b∗t+1 = b
∗(ht, st, bt, rht , r
s
t , yt, t),
which are valid in all periods t < T . At time T however, it must be true that
v(•, T ) = u(cT , hT+1) as v(•, T+1) logically have to equal zero.7 This anchoring
down of the T + 1 value function is key to finding a solution to the form on
the value function via the value function iteration procedure explained above.
Further, the decision rules must also ensure that sT+1 = 0 since anything else
would be either “illegal” or a waste of money. Note that we cannot put forward
a similar statement about housing and bonds. The reason is that last period
holdings of housing could, and should, be non-negative due to the formulation
of the utility function. As a consequence, the household can also be indebted
at death (as long as the credit constraint is not violated). Positive holdings of
bonds on the other hand, are ineﬃcient and should be barred when we later
implement the model.
5As opposed to a general equilibrium where markets must clear and with prices and allo-
cations solving the problems of both the production- and consumption side of the economy.
6Because the CRRA utility function is concave with diminishing utility from consumption,
a maximum exists. The convex set assumption simply means that no combination of variable
values, sanctioned by the budget- and credit constraint, is impossible.
7The household only lives until the end of period T so any utility delivered in period T +1
is of nil use regardless.
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3.2 Computation
As the household’s consumption-investment problem can only be solved numer-
ically, we will employ the Matlab software package to do the job. The code,
interweaved with step-by-step explanations, is available in Appendix B, so the
treatment here will be intentionally brief.
3.2.1 Time and parameters
For computational convenience we will assume that the household is “born” at
age 20 and dies at age 80. This lifespan is then divided into 12 periods, each
representing five years of the household’s life.8 The latter assumption of course
means that we will have to transform annual parameter values and annual return
estimates such that they are representative for longer periods.
We will see below that solving our problem numerically will require as much
computer power as possible, so we will elect to keep the labour income exogenous
and certain in every period. This measure frees up computer memory and
does not hinder an analysis of the average household allocations as such, but
it obviously takes us even further away from a realistic representation of the
economy. From Statistics Norway’s numbers9 on average household income
for cohorts (same division as in Table 1.3) we deduce the average income for
our cohorts10 (the 12 periods) and normalise the period income relative to
total, average household income. The result is the following stream of time-only
dependent labour income:
{yt}12t=1 = [0.47, 0.75, 0.96, 1.12, 1.23, 1.28, 1.28, 1.22, 1.11, 0.94, 0.71, 0.43] .
Of course, had we instead assumed a stochastic labour income process (e.g.
as in Hu (2005)) the household would presumably compensate for the added risk
by holding fewer risky assets and more of the risk-free asset. That is, it would
save more (or equivalently, pay down the mortgage faster) to hedge against a
possible lower future income stream. We briefly discussed this topic in Section
2.2.3 as well, and we should still read the below results with this caveat in mind.
As we experimented with two sets of asset return estimates in Chapter 2,
we find it natural to do the same here. The risk-free rate of return is then 0.02
8The notion of a “household” in this setting is admittedly quite abstract and perhaps not
immediately tangible. . .
9Table 3 in Income and Property Statistics for Households 2002, Statistics Norway. Avail-
able online: http://www.ssb.no/emner/05/01/nos_inntektformue/nos_d310/nos_d310.pdf
10We first assumed that average annual labour income in each Statistics Norway cohort also
was the average income at every age within the cohorts so that our cohort averages was found
simply by association. For example, the average for the 25-34 cohort was assumed to also
hold for our two corresponding cohorts, 25-29 and 30-34, and we found the five-year average
by simply multiplying by said number of years. Next, we plotted these averages in Excel
and fitted a second degree polynomial trend curve. The function of this trend line then gave
smoothened average incomes for “ages” one to 12. Finally, we normalised each new cohort
average by dividing by overall five-year average household income.
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and 0.03 annually for the “older” and the “newer” estimate sets respectively. To
obtain five-year period rates we transform these according to rf = (1+rf,a)5−1,
and thus end up with 0.1 and 0.16 respectively. The discount rate then follows
trivially from β = 1/(1 + rf ).
Statistics Norway reports average housing stock depreciation as around 3%
for the 1998-2004 period.11 Silos (2007) assumes 4.3% while Chambers et al.
(2005) use 2.2% for owner-occupied housing (both U.S. data). We are therefore
comfortable setting the depreciation rate to 0.03 annually so that we obtain
δ = (1.03)5 − 1 = 0.16 for the five-year periods.
The share of non-housing consumption is set to θ = 0.85 as Statistics Nor-
way reports average housing service expenditure being 15.7% of total household
consumption expenditure in 2004-2006.12 Housing service expenditure is there
defined as actual and imputed rent (not including electricity, heating, mainte-
nance or other costs). This parameter value is also fairly consistent with those
in the literature.13
The coeﬃcient on relative risk aversion is set to γ = 5 as in Hu (2005). This
assumption also seems reasonable when we consider our Chapter 2 results. Also
with justification in Chapter 2, we set the required downpayment rate to φ = 0.
3.2.2 State and control space
At the core of the numerical procedure of our choice, value function iteration,
lies the discretisation of the state- and control variables. In our original problem
formulation above it was in a way implied that these variables could take on
literally any value: there was no limitations imposed on the span of attainable
values (apart from the budget- credit- and non-negativity constraints of course)
nor on, say, the allowed number of decimals. In order for the computer to cal-
culate the solution to the problem in Equations (3.6)-(3.9), given our numerical
strategy, we must approximate these continuous spaces by discrete spaces. This
is done by setting upper and lower bounds for each variable’s value and by
defining a number of grid points between the extremes. All state- and control
variables will then be represented by row vectors of length equal to the number
of grid points.
As the bounds should not exclude any possible solutions, they will have to
be products of some trial and error, and, after playing around with the code of
Appendix B for a while, we settle on the following spans:14
(hmin, hmax) = (0, 8), (smin, smax) = (0, 6), (bmin, bmax) = (−6, 6)




13Cocco (2004), Flötotto (2006), Hu (2005) and Silos (2007) use 0.9, 0.8, 0.7 and 0.8 re-
spectively.
14The lower bounds on housing and stocks are intentionally set to zero due to the non-
negativity constraints.
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Obviously, the approximation will be better the finer the grids are, but the
computation can then take an awful lot of time. Had we had only one state-
and control variable we could easily have used a couple of hundred grid points,
but the sheer size of our problem combined with the limitations of available
computer power, forces us to accept a mere seven points.
The credit constraint in (3.9) cannot be imposed by simply restricting the
risk-free asset’s state space (as it may appear immediately above). Rather,
we will employ a penalty function that penalises the household financially if it
violates the constraint by subtracting a large number from the period utility.
That is,
uˆ(ct, ht+1) = u(ct, ht+1)− pen ·max(0,−bt+1 − ht+1)
where pen is some arbitrarily large number. As long as the household respects
the credit constraint, the latter term will be zero and thus not aﬀect utility.
If the debt is greater in magnitude than the housing investment however, the
household will be punished.
3.2.3 Approximation of stochastic returns
Following the method described in Adda and Cooper (2003:56), and developed
by Tauchen (1986), we can discretisise a continuous distribution by dividing
its probability density function into N equally long intervals and then find the
means over each interval. The probability of each of these values to be realised is
1/N if we assume the variables to be identically and independently distributed.
Generally, we have a normally distributed random variable rt with mean and
standard deviation μ and σ. The points on the distribution where we make the







where Ψ−1 is the inverse cumulative density function of the normal distribution.
After calculating these in Excel, we can find the mean value of each interval
according to
zi ≡ Nσ (ψ (ri)− ψ (ri+1)) + μ, (3.14)
where ψ is the probability density function of the normal distribution. Our
two stochastic variables, rst and rht , will be discretisised in this fashion by using
N = 3, the second coarsest approximation possible. The reason for doing this
is that the computational burden tends to “blow up” in magnitude when we
add more variables to the problem. In an attempt to avoid the dreaded curse of
dimensionality (Rust, 2006) we therefore seek to do this as simple as possible.
First, the two sets (“older” and “newer”) of annual means and standard
deviatons15 are transformed into five-year values by the standard rules, as is
15 In Chapter 1 we found the annual mean stock market return to be 0.188. The housing
return mean was 0.11 including an imputed rent of 0.04. We will use an annual mean of 0.07
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Annual Five-year Annual Five-year
Newer σha = 0.12 σh = 0.27 μha = 0.110 μh = 0.40
σsa = 0.20 σ
s = 0.45 μsa = 0.188 μ
s = 1.29
Older σha = 0.11 σh = 0.25 μha = 0.016 μh = 0.08
σsa = 0.18 σs = 0.40 μsa = 0.060 μs = 0.34
Generally; μ = (1 + μa)5 − 1 and σ =
√
5 · σa.
Table 3.1: Transformation of older and newer return estimates from annual
figures to five-year figures.
shown in Table 3.1. Next we find the “cuts” from Equation (3.13) and the




















where the probability for each outcome in all four cases is trivially equal to 1/3.
At this juncture we will issue yet another caveat to be kept in mind when
the discussion of results materialise below: the approximation of “newer” stock
returns is not fully capturing the fact that returns may be negative. Further,
we see that the worst-case outcome for stocks is a rate of return equal to 0.2
while the corresponding risk-free rate of return was set to 0.16. This means
that arbitrage is possible: the optimising household should borrow as much as
it can, invest in stocks, and collect a risk-free profit of at least 4%.
In Chapters 1 and 2 we also talked about the nineties and early noughties
being a period of mostly up-and-up in the stock market and that the “newer”
estimates might not be very representative for households’ beliefs nor of the
“true” nature of equity investment (whatever that is). Therefore, the output
presented below should in any case be taken with a pinch or two of sodium
chloride.
3.2.4 Simulation
After we have iterated over the value function and then found the decision rules
for the controls (and implicitly for consumption), we can easily simulate the life-
cycle behaviour and holdings of a number of households. As we elaborate on in
Appendix B, we elect to simulate 400 “lives” and seek the average allocations of
these. Since all households are identical with respect to labour income, initial
in this chapter to capture the capital component only. The annual mean standard deviation of
the stock market return was identified as 0.2. In Chapter 2 we noted that the corresponding
1966-1991 numbers were 0.06, 0.016 and 0.18 respectively.
Since practically all the risk associated with housing return presumably is due to the capital
component, we maintain the assumption of Chapter 1 that the standard deviation of housing
price appreciation is 60% of that of the stock market.
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endowments (zero holdings of all three assets), and decision rules, the diﬀerences
must stem from the realisations of the stochastic returns. That is, in the first
period all households make the same consumption- and investment decisions
since their “states” here are identical (no one has nothing!). From period 2
however, we will start to see diﬀerences: although everyone invested the same
in period 1, only some will get the “good” asset return rates in the beginning
of period 2. This means that the states now are diﬀerent so that the decision
rules will prescribe diﬀerent levels of investment for the households. The farther
away from the first period we get, the greater will the diﬀerences in the simulated
households’ holdings be.
This logic may ring true when we think a bit outside the model as well.
Suppose for instance that a group of individuals enter household/consumer life
with roughly the same endowments and expected human capital at the same
point in time. If they all act economically rational16 and are equally risk averse,
they will presumably be close financially at first, but then begin to drift apart.
Some might get lucky in the stock market, some might score big on their housing
investment, while others might end up submerged in debts.
Naturally, we would contribute this to diﬀerent overall choices, personalities,
preferences, education etc., but also to randomness (or luck) in, among other
things, asset returns.
3.3 Life-cycle results
The first results from our simulation are graphed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The
former shows the average life-cycle allocations for the 400 households, together
with the certain labour income, given the so-called “newer” asset return esti-
mates. We see a nearly full mortgage for the average household in the first
period, and a huge investment in housing. Consumption is practically equal to
labour income while stock market investments are zero. In period 2 both hous-
ing and consumption are lower (the latter significantly so) and stock market
investments are slightly positive. It perhaps seems people are sacrificing a lot
of overall consumption early on in order to get into the stock market.
From period 3 however, consumption levels grow tremendously and lie far
above labour income from period 5 onwards. Equity investments fall back in pe-
riod 3 but show steady growth from period 4. The households in the simulation
are responsibly paying down their debts over time rather than investing further
in other assets, thus exhibiting risk averse preferences. The stocks-risk-free ar-
bitrage mentioned in Section 3.2.3 is thus not fully exploited as the average debt
is consistently lower in magnitude than housing worth after period 4.
Note how diﬀerent this result is conceptually from what we found in Chapter
2. There, the only variables that governed the investor’s decision were the risk
and expected return of the market portfolio, i.e., the state of the market. Here
on the other hand, the household lets its own state of the world determine how
16A pretty big “if” though. . .
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Figure 3.1: Life-cycle allocations with newer estimates.
to invest so that optimal current and future actions are inextricably linked to
past decisions and to age. This means that the household can, to a certain
extent, control the conditions for optimal resource allocation.
Now, in the final period there is no future so it makes no sense to make
provisions for the next period. We see that stock investments here drop to
zero and that risk-free actually slips slightly below zero. The latter is OK as
long as the housing investment is positive, which it certainly is: since housing
consumption is determined by the amount of housing bought at the beginning
of each period, the household dies with “unspent” resources as it obviously
cannot sell and consume anything post mortem. Note also that non-housing
consumption shoots up in the final period as a consequence of the sudden sell-
oﬀ of stocks. The “unsmooth” stock holding development is perhaps due to
high stock market returns; maybe the average household is making too much
money on their equity to start the sell-oﬀ earlier?
Moreover, we see that, as stock holdings accumulate and debts are paid
down, housing stays fairly constant over time (until period 9 that is, when
housing shoots up while consumption stabilise). A possible explanation is that
households are using the capital gains from their housing asset to increase con-
sumption, pay down the mortgage and invest in the stock market, rather than
reinvesting it back into more housing. This makes perfectly good sense in our
model, but is it reasonable in the real world? Perhaps not, but it should be
possible for a household to take advantage of house price increases by taking
out new loans using the house as collateral, thus enjoying relatively low interest
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Figure 3.2: Life-cycle allocations with older estimates.
and a chance to make profits in the stock market.
Much of the discussion above is valid for Figure 3.2, which shows the av-
erage life-cycle allocations given the “older” return estimates, as well. We see
now however, that stock- and housing investments generally are greater than
in Figure 3.1. This may sound curious when we remember that the current
asset returns are consistently lower than those producing the allocations in the
previous figure: why would the households invest more now? In principle, this
may answer itself: households save/invest more now just because expected re-
turns are lower. In order to attain a certain level of “insurance” against overall
return uncertainty, and to push up future consumption, the amounts invested
in various assets must be higher when expected returns are lower. On the other
hand, lower returns on savings also translate into “today’s” consumption being
relatively cheaper than future consumption, thus households should postpone
consumption to a greater extent under the newer estimates.
We recognise both these eﬀects in Figure 3.2. Consumption breaks above
period income about one period earlier than in the previous figure, but then
stabilises at a much lower level. However, the overall picture looks quite odd:
how can the households aﬀord so much housing and stocks and still have so little
debt? Honestly, the graphed behaviour almost seems to be in violation of the
budget constraint itself! If this is true, it would certainly not be a very good
attestation of our solution strategy nor of our implementation. Timely then
perhaps, to remind ourselves of how coarse our numerical approximation is and
that slightly funny-looking results are to be expected. For instance, the distance
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between each grid point in the state/control space of the risk-free asset is 2. This
is necessary to capture the span of plausible values, but is an extremely coarse
approximation when we remember that the level of exogenous labour income
only spans from 0.43 to 1.28.
Let us assume the above unpleasantness away for now and briefly consider the
holdings of risk-free assets under the older return estimates. Positive amounts
of said bonds were not in any way necessary in the situation depicted in Figure
3.1 since the return on stocks never was lower than 20%. With the possibility of
negative returns on both housing and stocks however, a risk-averse household
would be wise to seek debt abolition at some point. Money in the bank is
a potential vital insurance for the households against (un)expected negative
shocks to the value of their holdings of stocks and housing. In our framework
the latter is particularly important since housing is assumed “rebought” in every
period and is an essential component in overall consumption and utility.
Figure 3.2 therefore makes sense in principle, but we see that risk-free turns
positive way too early compared to our observations in Chapter 1: while we in
Table 1.3 saw the average portfolio share of risk-free turn non-negative around
household age 60, the risk-free holdings prematurely shoots above zero at age
35 in said figure.
Bequest motives
In Section 3.1.3 we wrote that the representative household received no utility
after death so that v(•, T + 1) logically had to equal zero. We are not now
disputing the absence of post mortem utility but rather suggesting that it may
be very reasonable to instead assume that the household draws utility, while
alive, from knowing that someone else will benefit from the assets they leave
behind. That is, the household may very well be interested in bequeathing some
of its wealth to younger households. Such an assumption has the important
implication that v(•, T+1) then becomes positive: dying with unspent resources
(other than housing) yields utility in itself. Let us therefore assume that the
household now puts weight on assets left behind according to the CRRA utility
function such that
v(•, T + 1) = ((1− δ)(1 + r
h
T+1)hT+1 + (1 + r
s
T+1)sT+1 + (1 + rf )bT+1)
1−γ
1− γ .
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the modelled life-cycle allocations with such a
bequest motive imposed. The latter is virtually identical to Figure 3.2 apart
from the absence of equity sell-oﬀ at the end of the life-span, and from the lower
last-period consumption level. Figure 3.3 is also very similar to its non-bequest
twin, but the simulated households here appear to be buying risk-free bonds in
the last period. This sounds very reasonable given the data from Chapter 1, but
when we remember that the worst-case rate of return on stocks with the newer
estimates is 0.2 while the risk-free return is 0.16, the result’s status quickly
changes to “curious:” would it not be better to exit life with some (relatively)
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low-interest debt thus allowing greater holdings especially of stocks, but also of
housing?
Anyway; in the same spirit as our Chapter 2 eﬀorts we will now take a look
at how the model’s predictions match actual data. In Figures 3.5 and 3.6 we
have plotted the life-cycle allocations of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 against observed
Norwegian holdings in 2002.17 In the data, people start out with little housing
and debt, and virtually no equity. Housing over the life-span is then nicely
hump-shaped with a peak around period 7 (corresponding to age 50-54), while
debt increase up to period 4 (age 35-39) when it starts to fall again. From period
9 (age 60-64) risk-free holdings are positive and increasing. Stock holdings are,
as we have discussed to great length in earlier paragraphs, negligible throughout
compared to the other two asset holdings.
Clearly, the newer estimate allocations lie closer to the actual holdings than
those of the older estimates. This is immediately interesting because the portfo-
lio model in Chapter 2 produced the exact opposite conclusion: older estimates
were able to better explain observed behaviour than newer ones. But, as was
the recurring tune in the previous chapter, predicted stock holdings are wildly
out of line with the observations.
Although the simulated averages in Figure 3.5 are very jagged and imprecise
as such, they are nevertheless matching the smooth, observed holdings in a
broader sense. Apart from an initial jump, the housing evolution is not in
direct violation with the data; it increases early on, stabilise, and drop down
a bit in the latest periods. The model however, recommends postponing the
housing peak a few more years and exiting life with a higher housing stock.
The risk-free holdings are perhaps where the model and the data fit best:
both evolutions are falling initially, stabilising, and then growing until the end.
The diﬀerences lie in the magnitudes as the model suggests it is better to borrow
more early in life and to bequeath quite a lot more at the end. As always, actual
holdings of stocks are nowhere near the predictions of the model.
Now, if we turn the discussion on its head and say that “people are wrong
— the model is right,” we can conclude that households hold too much housing
and too little equity. Of course, this is basically the same remark we ended up
with in reference to the Chapter 2 model. Given the present model’s results,
we thus still observe overinvestment in housing and underinvestment in equity,
presumably due to the before mentioned binding housing constraint.
Credit constraint from labour income
An obvious inconsistency with real world data is that too much debt is allowed
relative to households’ labour income. While people are typically not granted
17These holdings are those reported in Table 1.3 which again originates from a table sim-
ilar to Table 1.1. The data is stretched, smoothened and normalised just like the exogenous
labour income above. In a nutshell: Statistics Norway’s cohort means were “translated” into
our 12-period means, plotted in Excel, approximated/smoothened by second degree polyno-
mials (third degree for risk-free for obvious reasons), and finally normalised by average labour
income.
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Figure 3.3: Life-cycle allocations with newer estimates and bequest motives.
















Figure 3.4: Life-cycle allocations with older estimates and bequest motives.
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Figure 3.5: Model vs. actual data. Newer estimates and bequest motives.
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Figure 3.6: Model vs. actual data. Older estimates and bequest motives.
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mortgages of magnitude greater than perhaps three or four times their annual
income, our model (Figure 3.3) predicts an average debt level of roughly eight
times labour income in period 1, and six times labour income in period 2.
However, a key simplification in our framework is that labour income is always
known and certain. As we have mentioned earlier, this assumption is quite far
from reality, but, given such an environment, a restriction on borrowing based
on period labour income almost seems “unfair” to the household: after all, the
entire human capital value is dead certain and should be taken into consideration
when loans are granted.
We will nevertheless perform a quick experiment by replacing the penalty
function described in Section 3.2.2 by
uˆ(ct, ht+1) = u(ct, ht+1)− pen ·max(0,−bt+1 − 4 · yt) (3.15)
so that household’s are not allowed to borrow more than four times their labour
income in any period. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the resulting allocations when
bequest motives are still assumed to be influencing households’ actions. Oddly,
many of our remarks on the diﬀerences between Figures 3.1 and 3.2 still apply
when we study the diﬀerences between Figures 3.3 and 3.7. Most notably, house-
hold’s do not seem to “need” mortgages to finance greater housing investments
nor equity purchases. . .
Clearly, something has gone wrong in the computation here as we are getting
results that are not making any sense whatsoever. What we would expect when
(3.15) is imposed instead of the benchmark credit constraint is of course that
housing, equity and consumption should be consistently lower, and that the new
credit constraint would be binding. Obviously, the household wants to consume
as much goods and housing as possible, and the best way to do this is to borrow
as much as possible (at least in Figure 3.7 where the equity return is never lower
than the risk-free rate). In our results however, there are only borrowing in the
first period and, given that households start out in period 1 with no endowments
other than the labour income of that period, the budget constraints are visibly
violated.
Had the experiment been successful it would have been most interesting to
study the eﬀect of the tougher credit constraint on the consumption-savings
trade-oﬀ: would stock holdings have had to be given up in order to maintain
a high level of housing consumption, or, would the household have had to be
content with less housing relative to stocks due to the latter’s profitability?
Would perhaps regular consumption be postponed even further so that the
household could still enter the stock market?
As we are unfortunately not able to provide a sound explanation of the
peculiarities going on in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, we will consider this yet another
lesson learnt in the inexplicable ways of the world. . .
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Figure 3.7: Life-cycle allocations with newer estimates, bequest motives and
labour income dependent borrowing constraint.
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Figure 3.8: Life-cycle allocations with older estimates, bequest motives and




Housing is typically the greatest investment, and the most valuable asset, of any
household. Overall, it dominates the household portfolios and is crucial in the
accumulation of wealth over time. Since housing assets can serve as collateral,
people are granted large mortgages, and thus even modest returns yield great
wealth boosts due to the sheer magnitudes of the investments. Naturally, owning
a home also produces housing benefits of great value to the owner-occupier.
Everyone needs a place to live and owning a home secures a steady flow of
dwelling services that would otherwise have had to be bought in the rental
market.
It is no surprise then that Norwegian households’ asset portfolios are undi-
versified: using data from the Income Distribution Survey 2002 from Statistics
Norway, we find that the average portfolio has a housing-to-wealth ratio of 1.175,
a stocks-to-wealth ratio of 0.089, and a debt-to-wealth ratio of 0.264. These fig-
ures mirror findings in similar surveys of other economies. Breaking the average
holdings down to age cohorts shows that young households hold much more
housing and debt relative to their wealth than older households. It is also evi-
dent that wealth accumulates a great deal over the life-cycle: when population
average wealth is normalised to unity, the cohort relative wealth goes from 0.074
for the youngest households, via 2.233 for 55-66 year olds, and finally down to
1.177 for households with head older than 80. The absence of equity holdings
are further notable throughout the study: even the portfolios of the wealthi-
est quartile contain only 10% stocks. Our key motivation is then the apparent
question; is this behaviour optimal and can the allocations be rationalised by
formal models? If not, what are then the theoretical recommendations?
For our model experiments, the return on risk-free holdings (i.e., bank de-
posits, loans and bonds) is estimated by an average of Norwegian real bond rates
over 1992-2006 less 28% tax, and amounts to a rate of 0.03 annually. Stock re-
turn is set to the price appreciation (less 28% tax) plus the dividend rate on the
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Oslo stock exchange, less inflation, over the same time period. Housing return
is similar as it also consists of a capital gain component and a dividend stream.
While the former is easily observed by the house price index from Statistics Nor-
way, the latter is not readily available due to lack of observations. However, with
justification in rental data and in theory of the benefit to the owner-occupier,
we settle on the before-tax, real risk-free rate as proxy for housing dividend. We
further elect to follow advice from the literature on the riskiness of single-home
housing investments, and set the standard deviation equal to 60% of that in the
stock market. The latter is found be 0.2 annually for the 1992-2006 period. The
reason for not simply using the risk exhibited by the house price index as our
measure is that this aggregates market transactions and thus cannot capture
the risk of buying a single house. We find mean rates of returns from housing
and stocks of 0.11 and 0.188 respectively, with a correlation of 0.33.
Real prices on stocks and housing have appreciated tremendously since the
early 1990s. In fact, real prices were fairly stable — or even decreasing — over
most of the 20th century, before going through a boom-bust period in the mid-
to-late eighties, and then literally taking oﬀ around 1993. Since then, real prices
have grown by roughly 490% and 260% respectively, and the returns to equity-
and house owners have clearly been enormous over these years.
Our first attempt at explaining or rationalising the observed household be-
haviour mentioned above is the employment of a static mean-variance model of
portfolio choice. We assume that the investor only cares about the expected
return and variance of the portfolio and that the objective is to minimise this
variance given a requirement on the expected return (this is of course equivalent
to maximising expected return given some risk tolerance). There are two risky
assets, housing and stocks, and one risk-free asset, simply called “risk-free.” The
two-fund separation theorem ensures that any investor household will choose a
combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. While the latter is
determined by the properties of the assets available to all investors, each in-
vestor will put a weight on the risky- and the risk-free portfolio according to his
or her level of risk aversion. The solution to such a setup will then be a set of
shares of housing, stocks and risk-free.
With return estimates based on observed asset performances over 1992-2006
we find that the holdings of stocks and housing should be virtually equal in
magnitude (the market portfolio composition of risky assets). The less risk
averse the household is, the more stocks, housing and debt should it take on.
More risk averse households on the other hand, should hold less of the risky
assets and positive amounts of the risk-free asset (i.e., bank deposits or bond
holdings). Since this result is very far from the observed holdings, we seek an
alternative solution by using diﬀerent return estimates.
Reliable data on equity dividend and on house- and stock prices are available
from 1966, so we collect asset properties for the 1966-1991 period and calculate
a new set of estimates. The resulting portfolio model solution is uplifting: the
framework now prescribes far less stocks relative to housing, which we know is
closer to actual allocations. For example, with a risk aversion coeﬃcient equal
to 3 we find an “optimal” housing share of 1.129, a share of stocks of 0.484,
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and a residual risk-free share of -0.613. This is not very far from the observed,
average household portfolio barring the weight on stocks (which is much lower
in the data). Further, there seems to be a clear relationship between age and
level of risk aversion. That is, for both sets of results, the high-risk aversion
portfolios match the observed holdings of older households better, while the
model portfolios with lower risk aversion coeﬃcients are better fits with younger
households’ allocations.
We have mentioned that younger households have the largest shares of hous-
ing in their overall portfolio, and that the share tends to decline with age. If we
now, as an extension of the applied portfolio model, assume that the amount
of housing is fixed and determined by the households’ demand for housing ser-
vice consumption, it may be interesting to find the optimal portfolios given the
housing share of each cohort. That is, what are the optimal shares of stocks
and risk-free when the household is already equipped with a certain expected
return and risk from the housing holdings?
Unfortunately, our analytical results make no sense in this case due to the
absence of a credit constraint : the model prescribes outrageously high portfolio
shares of stocks and debt. However, by imposing a limitation on how much
the households are allowed to borrow (“no more than minus the housing hold-
ings”) in a simple numerical procedure in Excel, we obtain far more reasonable
results. But, with the 1992-2006 estimates the model recommends an equity
share (which is never higher than 0.12 in the data) between 0.75 and 1 for all
cohorts and a debt share consistently greater than that in the data. When we
instead assume that the 1966-1991 estimates hold, the match with data is al-
most perfect: low portfolio shares of stocks throughout and a share of risk-free
virtually in sync with the Norwegian observations from 2002. It thus seems
like people either disregard the tremendous returns of the nineties and early
noughties as extraordinary and unsustainable, or that they enjoy even greater
utility from housing than what we have accounted for in our eﬀorts. In any
event, the older return estimates are better able to explain the observed 2002
holdings than estimates based on asset returns seen in the years around the
observation itself.
Our second main exercise is the employment of a dynamic life-cycle model.
This approach allows a far richer economic environment to be constructed for
the household as we now can consider intertemporal investment-consumption
choice and explicitly model the consequences of decisions. It is then assumed
that the household receives utility from regular consumption and from housing
consumption, and that the objective is, at all stages of life, to maximise the
present value of the remaining lifetime utility. While there are still two risky
assets and one risk-free asset, we are now adding a stream of labour income
which is to be optimally allocated between investment/savings and immediate
consumption.
As the lifetime optimisation problem is virtually impossible to solve ana-
lytically, we resort to the well-known numerical method of value function it-
erations. This procedure basically entails approximating an unknown function
(the present value of remaining lifetime utility — the value function) by iden-
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tifying the values of the choice variables that yield the greatest lifetime utility
at any point in time, and for all possible past investment decisions. Using this
function we next find consumption- and investment rules that prescribe optimal
actions given any previous set of allocations and asset returns, and thus solve
the household’s problem.
It is further assumed that the representative household begins life at age
20, dies at age 80, and that every period in the model corresponds to five
years. For computational tractability we abstract from income/human capital
uncertainty and simply set the household’s income equal to the (normalised)
average Norwegian income in 2002 for every period/age.
Since the solution is that of a representative household, we simulate the
“lives” of 400 individual households, find the average allocations and interpret
these as our solution. With the 1992-2006 asset return estimates we find that
the household should invest quite heavily in housing from the get-go by taking
on the maximum amount of debt (relative to the housing investment), while
equity investment and regular consumption are chiefly postponed till age 35.
From then on however, consumption levels grow tremendously and lie far above
labour income throughout. While equity holdings also grow over the life-cycle
and stabilise nicely between housing holdings and labour income, debts are
responsibly paid down by the simulated households.
Moreover, as the stock holdings accumulate and debts are abolished, housing
stays fairly constant over time. A possible explanation is that households are
using the capital gains from their housing asset to increase consumption, pay
down the mortgage and invest in the stock market, rather than reinvesting it
back into more housing. This makes perfectly good sense in our model, but may
not be too reasonable in the real world.
With the 1966-1991 asset return estimates we find mostly the same average
profiles except for holdings of stocks and housing being consistently greater than
with the 1992-2006 estimates. This sounds a bit curious since the former asset
returns are lower than the latter: why would the households invest more now?
One rationale is that the amounts invested in various assets must be higher when
expected returns are lower in order for the household to attain a comfortable
level of precautionary savings, and to be able to push up future consumption.
On the other hand, lower returns on savings also means that future consumption
is more expensive, thus households should save less and “eat” more.
As our model output shows that regular consumption is pushed forward but
attains lower overall levels over the life-cycle compared to the output with the
1992-2006 estimates, both above eﬀects are recognised.
In the final periods of these exercises, equity investments drop to zero since
we assume that there is no value in leaving anything behind. But what if we
instead say that the household draws utility, while alive, from bequeathing its
end-of-life worth to a younger generation? Solving this modified problem we
find, as expected, that the simulated households consume less and save more at
the end of their lives. Such a specification is of course much closer to reality since
it is commonly assumed that bequest motives exist, and because of the inherent
uncertainty of the time of death (which we characteristically have abstracted
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from in our theoretical escapades).
Finally, we compare the performance of the (bequest) model, with the two
sets of estimates, to the observed Norwegian life-cycle holdings, surveyed in
2002. We find that the newer estimates allocations lie much closer to the actual
holdings than those of the older estimates. This is immediately interesting
because the static portfolio model produced the exact opposite conclusion: older
estimates were able to better explain observed behaviour than newer ones. Even
though predicted stock holdings are still wildly out of tune with observations,
the dynamic model solved with the 1992-2006 estimates can explain the broad
features of households’ behaviour.
The lesson from both models is essentially either that households are holding
too little equity and too much housing in their portfolios, or that the models
themselves are not fully able to account for the high consumption of, and in-
vestment in, housing relative to other goods and assets.
Of course, the output of the models depend on the estimated asset return
properties, and herein lies the perhaps most interesting result from comparing
Chapters 2 and 3: while the framework of the latter produces a better explana-
tion of the 2002 observations with return estimates based on actual returns over
1992-2006, the Chapter 2 model performs better with estimates derived from
actual returns over 1966-1991. This would not have been of much value had it
not been for the fact that these two sets of estimates are very diﬀerent. The
newer set reflects the tremendous real appreciation over the last 15 or so years,
while the older set is more typical for the long-run exhibiting far lower returns
and little inter-asset correlation. The dynamic life-cycle model thus appears to
oﬀer a more realistic description of household behaviour, given that beliefs and
expectations are consistent with observed asset returns. On the other hand, the
static portfolio model performs beautifully if the households, for some reason,
believe in a less profitable stock market.
However, as the household’s holdings of housing are mostly driven by its
housing consumption demand, any talk of optimal portfolio composition may
almost seem irrelevant simply because there are very few investment options
left: given risk averse preferences and a determination on housing consumption,
the household has little choice other than paying down debts and maintaining a
high share of housing in its total portfolio. If it were to invest in equity rather
than abolishing debt, the overall risk would rise regardless of how diversified
the list of stocks were. Although the presence of risk from human capital is
abstracted from in our models, it can further illuminate the rationale behind the
observed behaviour of households: uncertainty regarding future labour income,
in addition to the risk from a large housing investment, is deterring equity
investment.
As such, the discrepancies between theoretical prescriptions and empirical
observations are not easily explained by our models, but the central mechanisms
of households’ financial behaviour certainly are.
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Appendix A
Calculations
The frontier of portfolios
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enable us to write the parabola function as
σ2p(μp) = Aμ
2
p +Bμp + C.
The tangency portfolio
Inserting Equation (2.3) into (2.2) yieldsp











2Aμ2T + 2BμT + 2C
(μT − rf )(2AμT +B) = 2Aμ2T + 2BμT + 2C
2Aμ2T +BμT − 2Aμ2T − 2BμT = 2C + 2AμT rf +Brf





Constants and the tangency point
With our estimated parameters we find the three constants:
A =








0.0353 · 0.016 + 0.0121 · 0.039− 2 · 0.0207 · 0.008
0.006084
= 0.1161
Inserting the constants in Equation (2.4) yields
μT = −
2 · 0.1161− 1.6154 · 0.03






Mean 0.056 0.060 0.020
SD 0.110 0.180 0.000
Table A.1: Asset return estimates based on actual returns over 1966-1991.
Source: Statistics Norway, Norges Bank, Oslo Stock Exchange and own cal-
culations.
which, from Equation (2.3), produce
σT =
q
Aμ2T +BμT + C
=
p




The portfolio with historical estimates
Using the numbers in Table A.1, together with the σhs = 0 assumption, we find










0.0036 · 0.0121 + 0.00314 · 0.0324
0.000016
= 9.073
so that the tangency point is defined by
μT = −
2 · 9.073− 317.55 · 0.02
−317.55 + 2 · 2781.25 · 0.02 = 0.0572
σT =
p
2781.25 · (0.0572)2 − 317.55 · 0.0572 + 9.073 = 0.0946
The capital market line, as in Equation (2.11):
μc = 0.02 + 0.3932 · σc






0.056− 0.06 = 0.7





Overall weights on housing and stocks are still given by
wh = (1− wf )w,
ws = (1− wf )(1− w).
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Appendix B
Numerical procedures
Portfolio model with constraints
The following setup is mostly from Chen et al. (2008). The expected returns,
the variances and covariances are first entered in an Excel spreadsheet as illus-
trated in Table B.1. Then we load the Excel Solver and impose the following
restrictions:
• Cell A6 must be equal to one at all time.
• Cell A4 must always be non-negative.
• Cell A5 must always be greater than or equal to negative A3.
Next, we do seven rounds of optimisation, one for each w¯h. In the first round
we set A3 to 2.848, in the second 2.607, in the third 1.492, etc. We then tell
Solver that cell B7 should be minimised for a given value in B9, by varying the
values in cells A3, A4 and A5. Of course, since the value in A3 is given, we are
only varying over A4 and A5.
For each w¯h we try a few diﬀerent values in B9 and store the corresponding
value in B8. This gives us a handful of points on each w¯h’s restricted portfolio
frontier which we then insert into the mean-variance utility function. By picking
the coordinates yielding the greatest utility on each frontier we read-oﬀ the
portfolio shares from cells A4 and A5.
It should be noted that the approximation producing the results in Chapter
2 was very coarse; only five or six points were identified for each w¯h. Further,
we had to set all variances and covariances above zero in order to get reasonable
results (otherwise we would be advised to invest everything in the risk-free
asset). The reason is that we were basically “cheating” a little bit when it
came to the risk-free asset because we incorporated it in the hyperbola of risky
assets rather than through the capital market line. We therefore sat the risk-
free asset’s variance, and the covariances that should have been equal to zero,
slightly positive.
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A B C D
1 Housing Stocks Risk-free
2 w¯h ws wf
3 w¯h A3·B2·σ2h A3·C2·σhs A3·D2·σhf
4 ws A4·B2·σhs A4·C2·σ2s A4·D2·σsf
5 wf A5·B2·σhf A5·C2·σsf A5·D2·σ2f






Table B.1: Spreadsheet setup in Microsoft Excel for solving portfolio optimisa-
tion problems numerically.
Matlab code for the Chapter 3 problem
1 % First, any variables or figures from previous sessions are




5 % Next we define the PARAMETERS of the model. Note that we
have two sets of estimates, "newer" and "older," but we
can obviously only use one at a time. Therefore,
whenever we comment "%N" and "%O" to the right of
expressions we mean that we have used EITHER %N or %O
throughout.
6 rf = .16; %N (newer estimate)
7 rf = .1; %O (older estimate)
8 beta = 1/(1+rf); % Discount rate
9 gamma = 5; % Coefficient of relative risk aversion
1 0 theta = .85; % Weight on non-housing consumption
1 1 delta = .16; % Housing depreciation rate
1 2
1 3 % The "penalty" discussed in the text is an arbitrarly high
number:
1 4 pen = 100000000000000;
1 5
1 6 % We use 7 grid points for all controls:
1 7 gb = 7;
1 8 gs = 7;
1 9 gh = 7;
2 0 % The 7 points are equally spaced between the upper- and
lower bounds as defined in the first two arguments of
the "linspace" function:
2 1 b = linspace(-6,6,gb);
2 2 s = linspace(0,6,gs);
2 3 h = linspace(.01,8,gh);
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2 5 % The rates of return on housing and stocks can take on
three values in the "older" and "newer" sets:
2 6 rh = [-.65 0.08 0.81]; %O
2 7 rs = [-.39 0.34 1.07]; %O
2 8 rh = [-.69 .4 1.49]; %N
2 9 rs = [.2 1.29 2.38]; %N
3 0 ph = 1/3; % Probability of each outcome in "rh"
3 1 ps = 1/3; % Probability of each outcome in "rs"
3 2 grh = 3; % Number of possible h-outcomes
3 3 grs = 3; % Number of possible s-outcomes
3 4
3 5 % Labour income is certain in all 12 periods:
3 6 y = [.47 .75 .96 1.12 1.23 1.28 1.28 1.22 1.11 .94 .71 .43];
3 7
3 8 % CONSUMPTION AND UTILITY arrays are found by defining c_t
and u_t for all possible combinations of state- and
control variables in all time periods. We assign
counters for all these variables:
3 9 for a = 1 : 12 % Time counter
4 0 for ib = 1 : gb % Counter for b_t
4 1 for is = 1 : gs
4 2 for ih = 1 :gh
4 3 for jb = 1 : gb % Counter for b_t+1
4 4 for js = 1 : gs
4 5 for jh = 1 : gh
4 6 for ns = 1 : grs % Counter for rs_t
4 7 for nh = 1 : grh
4 8 c(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh,jb,js,jh
) = y(a) + (1+rf)*b(ib)
- b(jb) + (1+rs(ns))*s
(is) - s(js) + (1-delta
)*(1+rh(nh))*h(ih) - h(
jh);























6 2 % Note that we immediately above ensured that consumption
cannot be negative by setting c_t near zero if the
optimisation was to prescribe a
6 3 % c_t below zero (we are setting it NEAR zero since the CRRA
function is
6 4 % not defined for zero inputs). Although we have listed two
penalty
6 5 % functions, only one was used at a time.
6 6
6 7 % As an inititial guess we set all continuation values to
zero:
6 8 v = zeros(13,gb,gs,gh,grs,grh);
6 9
7 0 % VALUE FUNCTION ITERATION
7 1 convcrit = 0.00000001; % Convergence criterion, a very low
number
7 2 diff = 1; % Arbitrary initial difference between v and Tv
7 3 iter = 0; % Iteration counter (obviously it starts at 0)
7 4
7 5 % A "while-loop" says that as long as the difference between
the value function and the UPDATED value function is
greater than our convergence criterion, we continue to
iterate.
7 6 % First, we have to define what the "after-death" value
function is. If the households have bequest motives, the
expression to the right of "%B" holds: the period 13
value function is equal to the utility from the wealth
left behind. If the household does not have bequest
motives, the expressions to the right of "%W" holds: if
stock investment is positive or zero in the last "living
" period, the value function is zero; if investment is
negative the household is penalised.
7 7 while diff > convcrit
7 8 for ib = 1 : gb
7 9 for is = 1 : gs
8 0 for ih = 1 : gh
8 1 for ns = 1 : grs
8 2 for nh = 1 : grh
8 3 %B Tv(13,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = ((RF*b(ib)
+ (1+rs(ns))*s(is) + (1+rh(nh))*h(
ih))^(1-gamma) - 1)/(1-gamma); %-
pen*max(0, - b(ib) - h(ih));
8 4 %W if s(is) >= 0
8 5 %W Tv(13,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = 0;
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86 %W else
8 7 %W Tv(13,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = -pen;







9 5 % The value function is the sum of instantaneous utility
and the discounted continuation value, the colons
represent the controls to be optimally chosen given
the state variables. Since there are three controls,
the value function expression must be maximised in
three operations, one for each choice dimension:
9 6 for a = 1 : 12
9 7 for ib = 1 : gb
9 8 for is = 1 : gs
9 9 for ih = 1 : gh
1 0 0 for ns = 1 : grs
1 0 1 for nh = 1 : grh




2 1]) + (1/9)*permute(v(a
+1,:,:,:,1,2),[4 3 2 1]) +
(1/9)*permute(v(a+1,:,:,:,1,3)
,[4 3 2 1]) + (1/9)*permute(v(
a+1,:,:,:,2,1),[4 3 2 1]) +
(1/9)*permute(v(a+1,:,:,:,2,2)
,[4 3 2 1]) + (1/9)*permute(v(
a+1,:,:,:,2,3),[4 3 2 1]) +
(1/9)*permute(v(a+1,:,:,:,3,1)
,[4 3 2 1]) + (1/9)*permute(v(
a+1,:,:,:,3,2),[4 3 2 1]) +
(1/9)*permute(v(a+1,:,:,:,3,3)
,[4 3 2 1])))));
1 0 3 end
1 0 4 end
1 0 5 end
1 0 6 end
1 0 7 end
1 0 8 end
1 0 9 % The function "squeeze" is to remove singleton
dimensions so that "permutated" continuation values
are of the same array dimensions as the utility
array, thus allowing them to be added together. This
procedure is the multi-dimension equivalent to
transposing two-dimensional matrices.
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1 1 0
1 1 1 % This is the end of "iteration 0" and we now prepare
for the next round. We first update the iteration
counter:
1 1 2 iter = iter + 1;
1 1 3 % Next comes the central mechanism of our solution
method. First, the difference between the two
functions are defined as follows:
1 1 4 diff = max(max(max(abs(Tv-v))));
1 1 5 % where "abs" refers to the absolute value. If "diff" is
greater than "convcrit" we go back to the top and
run another iteration AFTER updating the right-hand
side value function by the result of the previous
run:
1 1 6 v = Tv;
1 1 7 end
1 1 8
1 1 9 disp(iter) % Shows how many iterations were needed for
convergence
1 2 0
1 2 1 % DECISION RULES are found by first locating the points in
the control vectors yielding the highest value element
in the value function (which is now known thanks to the
iteration scheme above) for all states of the world, in
all time periods.
1 2 2 for a = 1 : 12
1 2 3 for ib = 1 : gb
1 2 4 for is = 1 : gs
1 2 5 for ih = 1 : gh
1 2 6 for ns = 1 : grs
1 2 7 for nh = 1 : grh




+1,:,:,:,1,2),[4 3 2 1]) + (1/9)*
permute(v(a+1,:,:,:,1,3),[4 3 2
1]) + (1/9)*permute(v(a
+1,:,:,:,2,1),[4 3 2 1]) + (1/9)*
permute(v(a+1,:,:,:,2,2),[4 3 2
1]) + (1/9)*permute(v(a
+1,:,:,:,2,3),[4 3 2 1]) + (1/9)*
permute(v(a+1,:,:,:,3,1),[4 3 2
1]) + (1/9)*permute(v(a
+1,:,:,:,3,2),[4 3 2 1]) + (1/9)*
permute(v(a+1,:,:,:,3,3),[4 3 2
1])));
1 2 9 [T2,tmp2] = max(T1);
1 3 0 [T3,tmp3] = max(T2);
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13 1 % The second argument of [.,.] is the
LOCATION of the first argument,
the actual value.
1 3 2 bgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = tmp1(
tmp3);
1 3 3 sgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = tmp2(
tmp3);
1 3 4 hgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = tmp3;
1 3 5 % The "grid rules" are arrays of the
opimal control vector elements for
all possible states of the world,
including time. The decision
rules are then simply arrays of
corresponding values:
1 3 6 bdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = b(
bgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh));
1 3 7 sdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = s(
sgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh));
1 3 8 hdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = h(
hgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh));
1 3 9 end
1 4 0 end
1 4 1 end
1 4 2 end
1 4 3 end
1 4 4 end
1 4 5
1 4 6 % Consumption follows trivially by inserting the decision
rules in the well-known budget constraint. Note that we
still make sure consumption cannot be negative in the
same manner as above.
1 4 7 for a = 1 : 12
1 4 8 for ib = 1 : gb
1 4 9 for is = 1 : gs
1 5 0 for ih = 1 : gh
1 5 1 for ns = 1 : grs
1 5 2 for nh = 1 : grh
1 5 3 cdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = y(a) + RF
*b(ib) - bdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh




1 5 4 if cdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) < 0
1 5 5 cdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) =
.00001;
1 5 6 end
1 5 7 wealth(a,ib,is,ih,ns,nh) = RF*b(ib) +
(1+rs(ns))*s(is) + (1-delta)*(1+rh
(nh))*h(ih);
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1 5 8 end
1 5 9 end
1 6 0 end
1 6 1 end
1 6 2 end
1 6 3 end
1 6 4
1 6 5 % SIMULATION of households over the life-cycle (period 1 to
12):
1 6 6 for i = 1 : 400 % No. of simulations
1 6 7 % First period wealth is zero so we set the counters
accordingly:
1 6 8 ib = 4; % Fourth element of the b-vector (equals b_1 =
0)
1 6 9 is = 1; % First element of the s-vector (equals s_1 = 0)
1 7 0 ih = 1; % First element of the h-vector (equals h_1 = 0)
1 7 1 for a = 1 : 12
1 7 2 draws = rand; % "rand" is a random number between
zero and one
1 7 3 % If rand < 1/3 the stock return rate is equal to
that of the first element of rs above. If 1/3 <
rand < 2/3 the return is that of the second
element, etc.
1 7 4 if draws < ps
1 7 5 rsstate = 1;
1 7 6 elseif ps < draws < 2*ps
1 7 7 rsstate = 2;
1 7 8 else
1 7 9 rsstate = 3;
1 8 0 end
1 8 1 drawh = rand; % Same as above.
1 8 2 if drawh < ph
1 8 3 rhstate = 1;
1 8 4 elseif ph < drawh < 2*ph
1 8 5 rhstate = 2;
1 8 6 else
1 8 7 rhstate = 3;
1 8 8 end
1 8 9
1 9 0 % Allocations are governed by the decision rules:
1 9 1 bt(a+1,i) = bdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,rsstate,rhstate);
1 9 2 st(a+1,i) = sdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,rsstate,rhstate);
1 9 3 ht(a+1,i) = hdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,rsstate,rhstate);
1 9 4 ct(a,i) = cdecrule(a,ib,is,ih,rsstate,rhstate);
1 9 5 % Update the individual states by what was invested
in the previous period and return to the top.
This continues until we have run through all 12
periods.
1 9 6 ib = bgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,rsstate,rhstate);
1 9 7 is = sgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,rsstate,rhstate);
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19 8 ih = hgridrule(a,ib,is,ih,rsstate,rhstate);
1 9 9 end
2 0 0
2 0 1 % Means of each "age" for all simulations: (note that we
abbreviate by only listing the first and the last "
mean" here)
2 0 2 bbar1 = mean(bt(2,:));
2 0 3 % through...
2 0 4 bbar12 = mean(bt(13,:));
2 0 5 % Same for all:
2 0 6 sbar1 = mean(st(2,:));
2 0 7 sbar12 = mean(st(13,:));
2 0 8 hbar1 = mean(ht(2,:));
2 0 9 hbar12 = mean(ht(13,:));
2 1 0 cbar1 = mean(ct(1,:));
2 1 1 cbar12 = mean(ct(12,:));
2 1 2
2 1 3 end
2 1 4
2 1 5 % PLOTTING
2 1 6 % Vectors of averages:
2 1 7 bbar = [bbar1 bbar2 .. bbar12];
2 1 8 sbar = [sbar1 sbar2 .. sbar12];
2 1 9 hbar = [hbar1 hbar2 .. hbar12];
2 2 0 cbar = [cbar1 cbar2 .. cbar12];
2 2 1
2 2 2 % Observed relative holdings:
2 2 3 trueh = [0.44 2.18 3.61 4.74 5.57 6.10 6.33 6.26 5.88 5.21
4.23 2.95];
2 2 4 trues = [0.00 0.10 0.22 0.32 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.31
0.21 0.08];
2 2 5 trueb = [-0.58 -1.46 -1.91 -2.01 -1.83 -1.45 -0.94 -0.37
0.17 0.62 0.91 0.94];
2 2 6
2 2 7 % We need to plot against time so we define a vector from 1
to 12:
2 2 8 tt = linspace(1,12,12);
2 2 9
2 3 0 % Figure plots:
2 3 1 figure
2 3 2 plot(tt,bbar,tt,sbar,tt,hbar,tt,cbar,tt,y)
2 3 3 q = legend(’b(t+1)’,’s(t+1)’,’h(t+1)’,’c(t)’,’y(t)’);
2 3 4 set(q,’Interpreter’,’none’)
2 3 5
2 3 6 figure
2 3 7 plot(tt,bbar,tt,sbar,tt,hbar,tt,trueb,tt,trues,tt,trueh)
2 3 8 q = legend(’Model b’,’Model s’,’Model h’,’True b’,’True s’,’
True h’);
2 3 9 set(q,’Interpreter’,’none’)
2 4 0
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2 4 1 figure
2 4 2 plot(tt,bshare,tt,sshare,tt,hshare)
2 4 3 qs = legend(’b(t+1)/W’,’s(t+1)/W’,’h(t+1)/W’);
2 4 4 set(qs,’Interpreter’,’none’)
2 4 5
2 4 6 % Fin
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